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STRANGERS IN PARADISE: GRIGGS V. DUKE
POWER CO. AND THE CONCEPT OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Alfred W. Blumrosen*
For good thoughts (though God accept them) yet towards men are
little better than good dreams, except they be put in act; and that
cannot be done without power and place, as the vantage and commanding ground.-Sir Francis Bacont

I.

PROLOGUE: THE OCCASION FOR A DECISION

March 1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) negotiated an extensive agreement with the Newport
News Shipyard to eliminate employment discrimination.1 The outcome of these negotiations-which were conducted by the Office of
Conciliations which I then headed-was the first major achievement
for the EEOC under title Vll2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Following that episode, Ken Holbert, Deputy Chief of Conciliations,
and I decided to try to negotiate a model conciliation agreement on
the subject of discriminatory employment testing. We knew that
many companies had introduced tests in the 1950's and early 1960's

I

N

• Professor of Law, Rutgers University. Chief of Conciliations, United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 1965-1967. Consultant since 1967 to Department of Labor, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of
Justice, and EEOC. Executive Consultant to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission,
1972. B.A. 1950, J.D. 1953, University of Michigan.-Ed. The views expressed in this
Article are those of the author and not necessarily those of any governmental agency.
t Of Great Place, in FRANCIS BACON'S EssAYs 31-32 (Everyman's Library ed. 1906).
1. See generally A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 328-407 (1971).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970),
prohibits discrimination in employment on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. It creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which
is authorized to receive charges of discrimination, to investigate such charges, and where
it has reasonable cause to believe a charge is true, to attempt to eliminate the alleged
discriminatory employment practice by informal conciliation and persuasion. If conciliation fails, the charging party is entitled to sue in federal district court. The process is
described in M. SOVERN, LEGAL R.EsrRAlNTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
61-102 (1966).
The Commission established an Office of Conciliations. From its creation until April
1967, I served as Chief of that Office. Mr. Holbert was my deputy at the time. He
later served as Acting Director of Compliance and Acting General Counsel. The work
of the Office is described in A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 51-101.
In March 1972, Congress amended title VII to enable the EEOC to sue private
employers if conciliation failed. The Commission was also given jurisdiction over state
and local government employment. Also, Congress designed the procedure so that the
EEOC could not prevent an individual from suing. Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.

[ 59]

60

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:59

when they could no longer legally restrict opportunities of blacks and
other minority workers and that the tests had proved to be major
barriers to minority advancement. We therefore sought to negotiate
a solution that would induce industry either to stop using these tests,
or, at the least, to modify their use so that they did not have a discriminatory effect.
Our attempt failed completely. We chose as the springboard for
obtaining the model settlement a finding of the Commission that
there was reasonable cause to believe a paper company in Louisiana
had violated title VII,4 because the finding had mentioned the use of
tests. However, when we attempted to negotiate on the testing issue,
company officials pointed out that the reasonable-cause finding had
merely alluded to the issue of employment tests. They maintained
that their tests for general ability were important in enabling them
to secure generally competent workers and that by using these tests,
the company had developed a capable work force. They would not
give up the tests unless compelled to do so. And we could not persuade the officials that title VII required the abandonment of these
devices.
As we flew back to Washington, we reflected on the setback we
had just received. We concluded that further conciliation efforts concerning testing would be useless unless the Commission published a
clear official statement delineating what the law required. 'Without
such official support, efforts at persuasion would fail because of the
employer's intense interest in retaining his testing programs. We
therefore decided to press within the EEOC for the adoption of
guidelines that would resolve the legal questions concerning discriminatory testing. We encouraged discussions within the Offices
of Research and Compliance and the involvement of outside specialists in the testing field, and sought the opinion of the EEOC's General Counsel. The Commissioners and staff acted on our urging. As
a result, the Commission issued its guidelines on employment testing
on August 24, 1966.5
4. Before the EEOC can begin conciliation proceedings, it must find that there is
reasonable cause to believe a charge of discrimination is true. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)
(1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 4, 86 Stat. 104. The evolution of this procedure is described in A. BLUMROSEN, supra
note I, at 43-47.
5. The original guidelines were issued in a printed pamphlet. A brief excerpt appears
at 35 U.S.L.W. 2137 (EEOC announcement, Aug. 24, 1966). A more detailed version
of the guidelines was published on August 1, 1970, in the Federal Register. 35 Fed.
Reg. 12333 (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1972)). The original guidelines were
developed in the Office of Research and Reports under the general supervision of its
then director, Charles Markhem, and the direct supervision of its then Chief of Technical Studies, Phyllis Wallace.
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The guidelines represented the EEOC's interpretation of section
703(h) 6 of title VII, which permits the use of a "professionally developed" ability test so long as that test is not "designed, intended or
used" to discriminate. They rejected the position that the use of any
test developed by a professional in the field of institutional or industrial testing was protected under title VII and thus laid to rest one
of the arguments presented by employers in conciliation conferences.7
The guidelines also interpreted the phrase "professionally developed"
to refer to tests measuring an employee's ability to perform the
specific job or class of jobs for which he has applied, and thereby
rejected the argument that an employer could test for "general
ability or promotability."8 The remainder of the guidelines constituted a Commission endorsement of contemporary psychological
testing standards developed by professional associations.
For those of us involved in title VII's administration, the guidelines provided the basis for a determination that certain testing practices were illegal. On this authority, our Office resumed efforts at
conciliation. The case of the paper company in Louisiana was reexamined by the Commission under the guidelines and a revised reasonable-cause finding issued. This opinion was among the first
published by the Commission and was later cited by the Supreme
Court.9 Many other cases were processed under the guidelines. In
some, attempts at conciliation were successful. When negotiations
failed or were not undertaken because of the huge backlog of work
at the Commission, suits were frequently brought in federal court
under title VII, often with the litigation conducted by attorneys of
the NAACP or the Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
One such case was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.10 It reached the
6. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
7. The opening paragraph of the 1966 guidelines reads:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that an employer may give
and act upon the results of "any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test ••• is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race•••"
(Sec. 703(h)). The language of the statute and its legislative history make it clear
that tests may not be used as a device to exclude prospective employees on the
basis of race. The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed
ability tests" to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required
by the particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly
affords the employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a
particular job or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual
or organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without more,
justify its use within the meaning of Title VII.
8. See note 7 supra.
9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 n.6 (1971). The Commission's opinion,
with the parties' names deleted, appears in CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1J 17,304.53 (EEOC
Dec. 2, 1966) and is reprinted in Appendix A infra.
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Supreme Court and provided the first occasion for the high court to
determine the nature and scope of the prohibition on racial discrimination in employment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11
Although issued without fanfare, Griggs is in the tradition of the
great cases of constitutional and tort law which announce and apply
fundamental legal principles to the resolution of basic and difficult
problems of human relationships. The decision has poured decisive
content into a previously vacuous conception of human rights. It
shapes the statutory concept of "discrimination" in light of the social
and economic facts of our society. The decision restricts employers
from translating the social and economic subjugation of minorities
into a denial of employment opportunity, and makes practical a
prompt and effective nationwide assault by both administrative agencies and the courts on patterns of discrimination.12
The assumption underlying Griggs is that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 protects the interests of minority groups and their members in
securing and improving employment opportunities. Griggs views
discrimination not only as an isolated act by an aberrant individual
wrongdoer that affects only an individual complainant, but also as
the operation of industrial-relations systems that adversely affect
minority group members. Title VII law thus focuses on the harm to
both the group and the individual.
Griggs redefines discrimination in terms of consequence rather
than motive, effect rather than purpose. This definition is new to the
field of employment discrimination, in which a subjective test had
previously been used. The Court applied this new definition to
invalidate hiring standards based upon education and testing, and
in the process gave strong legal sanction to the EEOC's statutory
interpretations.
Significantly, the Griggs opinion was written by Chief Justice
Burger, and concurred in by seven of his brethren Qustice Brennan
11. The first case reaching the Supreme Court dealing with substantive rights under
title VII was Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), in which a company
rule against hiring women with preschool-age children was challenged. The Court held
implicitly that sex did not have to be the sole cause of deprivation of female employment opportunities for a practice to be discriminatory. It was enough that men
with preschool-age children were hired. However, the Court left open the possibility
that the employment practice was a bona fide occupational qualification under the Act.
The only other Supreme Court decision on the merits, Love v. Pullman Co., 404
U.S. 522 (1972), upheld an EEOC administrative procedure concerning federal-state
relations in the processing of cases under title VII. The Court made it clear that a
technical reading of title VII's procedural provisions was inappropriate,
12. In March 1972, approximately one year after Griggs, Congress amended title
VII and strengthened the powers of the Commission and the rights of the complainant.
See note 2 supra.
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absented himself from the case). The case was decided during a: time
in which the Supreme Court appeared to be shifting toward a cautious approach to constitutional issues.13 Yet, it is a sensitive, liberal
interpretation of title VII. It has the imprimatur of permanence and
may become a symbol of the Burger Court's concern for equal opportunity. Although the Court may take a more cautious approach
to constitutional rights of minorities,14 Griggs makes clear that sympathetic interpretation of statutory rights is the order of the day.
This dichotomy accords with the notion that the legislature rather
than the courts should be the prime policy maker in this field. The
recognition of legislative suzerainty in this area should be, in the
long run, desirable. At this point in our history, many important
civil rights have received statutory recognition from Congress.15
It is more important, today, that we be concerned about the broad
and practical implementation of these rights than about their constitutional foundation. A judge may feel more comfortable in rendering a liberal interpretation of a statute than in interpreting the
Constitution since a decision based on the Constitution is less easily
revised.
II.

EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY DAY FOR BLACK WORKERS IN THE SOUTH

In Griggs, the Supreme Court dealt with an archetype of the subordination of black workers in the South. This pattern, explored in
cases16 and by commentators,17 involved a broad range of industrial1!1. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), with Shapiro v. Thompson,
!194 U.S. 618 (1969).
14. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson,
40!1 U.S. 217 (1971).
15. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1970)), recognized the right to be free from discrimination
in places of public accommodation, from segregation in public facilities, from dis•
crimination in federally assisted programs, and from discrimination in employment.
The right to be free from discrimination in voting was strengthened by the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73p
(1970). Title VIIl of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-19 (1970)), established the right to be free from discrimination
in housing.
16. E.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F.
Supp. 5!16 (E.D. La. 1970); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968).
17. E.g., A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 159-217; R. MARsHALL, THE NEGRO AND
ORGANIZED LABOR. (1965); Cooper 8e Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82
HAR.v. L. REv. 1598 (1969); Gould, Employment, Security, Seniority and Race: The
Role of Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967); Rosen, The
Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1965).
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relations devices and understandings that defined the "place" of
black workers.
In enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress provided a oneyear delay in the effective date18 to give labor and management an
opportunity to comply voluntarily with the Act's provisions, and to
allow the EEOC and the Department of Justice to "tool up" for the
enforcement of the Act. Neither of these events occurred. During
this one-year moratorium, southern industry engaged in a flurry of
activity that sometimes involved genuine changes in industrialrelations systems, but more often produced only a "cosmetic change";
many employers adopted seemingly neutral personnel policies, which,
in fact, perpetuated the subordinate position of black workers.19
Tests and educational requirements were adopted extensively in the
early 1960's to achieve this result. The tests could be justified as
"sound" personnel practices and would also permit an employer to
continue the subordination of minorities.
Before 1965 at the Duke Power Company, blacks were assigned
only to the labor department to perform janitorial and low-level
maintenance work throughout the Dan River Steam Station. All jobs
in other departments were reserved for whites. 20 The economic bite
of the discrimination was clear. The top rate of pay in the "black"
department was $1.55 per hour, which was fourteen cents below the
bottom rate in the white departments and nowhere near the white
departments' top rates, which ranged from $3.18 to $3.65 per hour.21
The company did not have formal criteria for employment when this
system of segregation was first implemented, but in 1955 it started
to require a high school diploma for employment in the white departments, ostensibly to upgrade the quality and flexibility of the
work force.22 Blacks with high school diplomas were, after 1955, still
employed only in the labor department.23
18. Civil Rights Act ~£ 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 266.
19. Seniority systems were revised in some instances to permit minority workers to
enter all-white jobs, with lower seniority than those white workers already employed,
in accordance with the principle of Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959). (For a discussion of Whitfield, see text
accompanying notes lll-13 infra.) Other seniority systems which had been fair on their
face but which operated with an understanding that minority workers could not rise
above a certain level of jobs, were reformed to reduce the formal opportunities for
minorities.
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 247 (M.D.N.C. 1968), modified, 420
F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), revd., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1970), revd., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
22. 420 F.2d at 1228-29,
23. 292 F. Supp. at 247.
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Duke Power responded to title VII's enactment by revising its
hiring and transfer standards in 1965. A simple test was imposed for
entry into the black (labor) department.24 For initial employment in
the previously all-white departments, the passage of two standard
industrial tests--the Wonderlic and the Bennett-was superimposed
upon the high school diploma requirement.25 For transfer of incumbents between departments, the company at first required a high
school diploma.26 This requirement kept the black workers without
diplomas from crossing into the white departments, but it also prevented some white workers in the least desirable white units from
transferring into other white departments. They protested, and the
company then provided that the passage of the two tests, Bennett and
Wonderlic, would be sufficient to transfer between departments.27
Workers in the white departments without high school diplomas
were not required to take any tests to retain their jobs or to be
promoted within their departments.
When the company had completed its response to title VII in
1965, three classes of blacks could be discerned:
I. Blacks possessing high school diplomas who were in the labor department by virtue of the racial assignment. They had not transferred to previously white units prior to the filing of the complaint with the EEOc.2s
2. Blacks hired into the labor department before July 2, 1965, who
did not have high school diplomas. They had to pass the two
tests to transfer into the white departments, whether they were
hired before or after the high school diploma requirement was
implemented in 1955.
3. Black applicants for new employment after July 2, 1965. To obtain employment in what was previously the black department,
they had to pass a simple test. To be employed in a formerly
white department, they had to have earned a high school diploma
and to pass the two tests. The same standards were applied to
white applicants for employment.

As a class action,29 the Griggs litigation involved those black
workers who had achieved formal education but had found that it
24. 292 F. Supp. at 245.
25. 292 F. Supp. at 245-46.
26. 292 F. Supp. at 246.
27. 292 F. Supp. at 246.
28, Of the fourteen blacks employed at the Dan River Station, three had high school
diplomas. One of them was transferred from the labor department after charges had
been filed with the EEOC but before suit was brought in district court. 401 U.S. at
427 n.2; 420 F.2d at 1229. The other two blacks were promoted during the pendency
of the suit. 420 F.2d at 1229.
29. 292 F. Supp. at 244.
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did not help them obtain better jobs, those who did not have as
much formal schooling and were locked into the black department,
and those black workers in the labor market who had a lower level of
form.al education and who scored lower on tests than white workers in the labor market. These facts and interests shaped the issues
of the case which, in tum, illuminated the fundamental legal question under title VII: how is discrimination defined?
III.

WHAT

Is

DISCRIMINATION?

During the twenty-year period preceding 1965, a time in which
some legal effort to eradicate or control racial discrimination in employment had been made, there was little opportunity for the courts
or legal scholars to work out carefully a legal definition of discrimination.30 The term had not acquired a fixed meaning in the context of
employment opportunities, a result in part attributable to the failure
of civil rights agencies to adopt a definite law enforcement approach
in administering federal and state fair-employment-practice laws and
regulations. 31 The state civil rights agencies tended to concentrate
their efforts on achieving "voluntary compliance," which meant that
they did not take many cases through the administrative-hearing
procedures.32 By 1962, the civil rights agencies in the twelve states
that established such bodies during the 1940's and 1950's had
brought, together, only sixty-two cases to public hearing. 33 Since the
state courts would pass on the legal questions concerning discrimination under the state statutes only after the agency process was completed, the nonlitigation approach adopted by the state civil rights
agencies meant that courts rarely had to deal with discrimination
problems. The few state court opinions that did face up to the issue
provided little aid in resolving the problem of defining discrimination. It is not too helpful to be told that discrimination can be practiced by "methods subtle or elusive,"34 if we are not told of its contours.
The legislators have responded to the tragic social and economic
plight of minorities through the enactment of civil rights legislation.
30. M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 42-43:
[W]hether an employer has discriminated is a subtle factual question made
especially difficult by uncertainties in the very meaning of discrimination, a term
the statutes do not define. • • • The statutes are quite general and litigation has
been so infrequent that the courts have had little occasion to supply guidance.
31. See generally Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement
of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARV. L. REv. 526 (1961).
32. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 14.
33. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
34. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954).
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They sought to provide a legal solution to a complex social problem
and uniformly left many problems, including the definitional problems, to the agencies that must enforce these laws and to the courts
that must pass upon the validity of these agencies' policies and
actions.
At the risk of some simplification, we can identify in the law and
literature three concepts concerning the nature of discrimination in
employment opportunities. In the order of their emergence, they
are as follows:
Concept of Discrimination
I. Discrimination con•
sists of acts causing
economic harm to an in•
dividual that are motivated by personal antipathy to the group of
which that individual is a
member. Proof of discrimination requires evidence of acts, motive
(a mens rea), and harm.
2. Discrimination consists of causing economic
harm to an individual
by treating members of
his minority group in
a different and less
favorable manner than
similarly situated
members of the major•
it}' group. Proof involves evidence of
differential treatment
and harm, Defense of
justification available.
3. Discrimination consists of conduct that
has an adverse effect
on minority group members as compared to
majority group members,
Defense of justification
for compelling reasons
of business necessity
is recognized.

Interest Protected
and Type of Conduct
Proscribed

Common Law
Parallel

Individual economic
interest of complainant.
Protected agamst deliberate denials of employment opportunities based
on racial prejudice.

Cases involving
malice or will£ul
and wanton misconduct. Mens
rea in criminal
law.

Recognition of the individual's interest in
securing the same treatment as whites,
"Unequal treatment"
which may be evidence
of racial animus.

Negligence cases
in which reasonable man standard
has not been adhered
to by defendant. Also,
constitutioual cases
involving equal protection, particularly the
jury cases.

Group interest in
seeing that its members are not harmed
in employment because
of discrimination elsewhere in the society.
Individual interest
in economic opportunities.
Protected against
all types of conduct
where the injury is
foreseeable. Covers
all industrial-relations systems because
their consequences
are foreseeable.

Res ipsa loquitur.
Interference
with advantageous
relations. Strict
liability.

Initially, the dominant if not exclusive definition of discrimination was based upon the evil-motive, mens rea, or state-of-mind test.35
35. See, e.g., Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practice
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Under this test, it was necessary to establish that respondent was
motivated by dislike or hatred of the group to which complainant
belonged. This concept produced a series of almost insuperable difficulties, as individual cases became bogged down in the vagaries of
fact-finding. The potential law enforcement thrust of the statute was
lost in the search for circumstantial evidence that would reveal the
employer's state of mind. This subjective focus contributed to the
acceptance of the view that education of employers on the legal implications of employment discrimination rather than law enforcement
was the proper procedure to follow in eliminating discrimination.
This emphasis on voluntary compliance contributed substantially to
the ineffectiveness of the state agencies.36
Civil rights advocates realized in the 1950's that the state agencies
were floundering, and therefore attempted to push legislatures into
enacting procedural changes that they thought would free agencies
from the bog of individual case-handling. They sought for the agencies the power to initiate "pattern-centered proceedings," which
could be commenced on the basis of the agency's analysis of a general situation rather than on the basis of individual complaints.87
This campaign was frequently successful as far as securing legislation
was concerned, but success stopped in the legislative hallway; it did
not carry into the administrator's office. Civil rights advocates to this
day have not realized the importance of continuing political pressures with respect to both the budget and the top staff appointments
of civil rights agencies. This deficiency is not found in the political
activities of either labor or management.
In addition to this deficiency, the administrators lacked a legal
concept that would enable them to discover a pattern of discrimination. How does one find a "pattern" of individual, evilly motivated
acts that cause economic harm to individual minority group members? The procedural change permitting pattern investigations did
not have, as a corollary, a substantive change in the concept of discrimination.38 It therefore proved to be of little use.
It did, however, force the evolution of a second and closely related concept of discrimination. State agencies began to apply the
Legislation I: Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 907, 955-56 (1967); Note, An American
Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 107, 109 (1949).
36. See generally A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 3-50; M. SovERN, supra note 2, at
19-60.
37. See generally M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 31-46.
38. Blumrosen, Antidiscrimination Laws in Action in New Jersey: A Law-Sociology
Study, 19 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 189, 234-37 (1965), discusses the substantive implications of a
government-initiated proceeding in which no individual bas filed a complaint.
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"equal protection" concept of discrimination.39 This test might be
viewed simply as a method of proving the evil motive required under
the earlier concept of discrimination. Even so, the equal-treatment
test became recognized as a distinct method for discerning discrimination40 and continued to provide a method for discerning discrimination as late as 1965. Professor Sovern expressed the prevailing view
when, shortly after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted, he suggested that discrimination required a purpose or motive to harm an
individual because of his race, which purpose could be inferred from
certain conduct, mainly that denying equal treatment to minorities:u
The fundamental question which permeated the activity of the
EEOC in its formative days under title VII and which has since consumed much of the energy of lawyers and judges in cases brought
under title VII has concerned the concept of discrimination. Respondents have pressed to confine title VII within the mold of the older
definitions, while the EEOC, the Departments of Justice and Labor,
and plaintiffs' counsel in individual cases have sought to establish,
in the crucible of administration and litigation, an additional dimension to the concept.
This effort was, without doubt, crucial. The traditional definitions of discrimination permitted the employer to translate the unfair treatment of minorities in other segments of society into a limitation on employment opportunities. For example, a much higher
proportion of minority group members than of whites are arrested.~
Therefore, a policy that prohibits employment of persons with arrest
records will exclude a higher proportion of minorities, and thus the
administration of the criminal law may restrict employment opportunities of minorities.43 Similarly, if, as in Griggs, the employer
requires a high school diploma and minorities have a smaller propor39. The equal protection concept bad been articulated as early as 1947. Note, The
New York State Commission Against Discrimination: A New Technique for an Old
Problem, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 849 (1947), discussing the then new New York statute,
stated: "[I]t insures only that the same standards be applied to all employees and
applicants."
40. For an application by a state commission of the equal protection standard, see
Lefkowitz v. Farrell, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 393 (N.Y. Com.nm. Human Rights 1964),
discussed in M. SovERN, supra note 2, at 179-203.
41. M. SovERN, supra note 2, at 70-73. Professor Sovern thought that employment
tests were legal under title VII even if not job-related. However, be thought the EEOC
should try to persuade employers to use requirements more suited to the individual job.
Id. at 73. See also note 54 infra.
42. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
43. The practice of automatically disqualifying applicants with several arrests (but
no convictions) when not compelled by business necessity was held unlawful in Gregory
v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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tion of high school graduates for reasons rooted in their subordination, the diploma requirement spreads the effects of discrimination
in education into the employment field. If an employer locates in a
white suburban area and selects his employees from residents of the
area, the pattern of housing opportunities will have a similar limiting
effect on employment opportunities; or if an employer with an allwhite work force only selects employees referred by his present employees, patterns of social segregation will determine the racial composition of his work force.
These practices were not condemned by either of the traditional
definitions of discrimination. An employer could impose such requirements without an intent to exclude minorities, for each of the
requirements could be justified on grounds of business convenience.
That is to say, the employer might not want to take risks associated
with persons having arrest records, or have workers without the general education or the perseverance evidenced by a high school diploma, or risk the increased tardiness that may be associated with an
employee's living far from the plant, or have a possibly inharmonious
social situation occur in the plant as a result of an integrated work
force. In making these decisions, the employer would not be violating
the evil-motive concept of discrimination. In addition, the employer
could impose these requirements "equally" on white and black alike,
and, as a result, not violate the equal-treatment concept of discrimination either.
The older concepts of discrimination thus permitted the employer to insulate his employment practices from the social and
economic problems that had arisen in society as a consequence of
the pervasive pattern of discrimination and subordination of minorities. Employers simply did not have to address themselves to this
problem. Hence, under these older concepts, minorities remained at
the bottom of seniority lists and at the top of the unemployment
statistics. Meanwhile, the industrial-relations system went on its way,
leaving the subordinated position of minorities unchanged. Prior to
title VII and Griggs, employment was not a meaningful avenue of
escape from subordination.
Under the pressures of day-to-day decision-making by administrative agencies, with the aid of the private and government attorneys
who brought the first litigation under title VII,44 with some academic
44. EEOC findings of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of title VII had
occurred were based on the new objective definition. The EEOC Office of State and
Community Affairs under the direction of Peter Robertson encouraged state agencies
to adopt objective standards in dealing with the problem of fair recruitment.
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assistance45 and through the initial judicial decisions,46 the third
concept of discrimination was born. It sought to relate the law of
discrimination more closely to the social problems that had generated
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under this concept
discrimination was measured in terms of the adverse consequences
inflicted upon minorities, no matter how achieved. Discrimination
became conduct rather than a state of mind-conduct that was illegal
unless justifiable under the narrow corridor provided by title VII.47
This third concept of discrimination drew heavily on the conceptual framework provided by the law of torts for a legally sound
analysis that would make the Civil Rights Act of 1964 viable. The
seniority and testing cases in the South, and the recruitment and
hiring problems in the North, provided the occasion for the application of this concept. It emerged from a matrix of legal, jurisprudential, and sociological ideas.
These ideas are not described here in order to analyze their implications. Rather, they have operated as forces on the minds of those
who shaped the law. They represent ways of thought that possess a
long jurisprudential history and are embedded in the attitudes of
lawyers. Once a concept is grasped, it is often applied without conscious awareness of or reference to its genesis. This predisposition
is of fundamental importance in understanding the actions taken by
administrators, advocates, and judges.
One significant idea arose from legal concepts permeating the
law of tort. The intentional infliction of harm is generally actionable in tort law unless justified. Intention, however, is a legal construct that can connote a range of mental states, from a desire to
reach a given result, to the likelihood that a given result will flow
from a given action.48 In the federal statutory context, for example,
the concept that the foreseeable results will be viewed as intended
45. The clearest discussion of the necessity for a shift to the objective discrimination
is Cooper 8: Sobel, supra note 17. Their concern was generated in part by their participation as counsel in several title VII cases. I articulated the same conclusion in my
works Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERS
L. REv. 268 (1969), and The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of
196-1, 22 id. 465 (1968).
46. Parham v. Southwestern :Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Local 189,
Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Hicks v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1970); Clark v. American Marine
Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1969); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp.
413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
47. For a discussion of the narrow corridor afforded by business necessity, see pt. V

infra.
48.

W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §

8 (4th ed. 1971).
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is well understood.49 The concept of interference with advantageous
relations, such as contractual relations, is a special case of intentional
tort theory. 50 It was devised to deal with the type of interests in
economic activity that are similar to those protected under title
VII.51 Basic notions concerning what is intentional interference
with an advantageous relation may have contributed to the rise of
this third concept of discrimination.
A second idea is that of legal protection for group interests. Dis•
crimination of the type prohibited by title VII is a class- or grouporiented phenomenon that challenges the status of every member
of the class.52 Thus the group has an interest in the status of each
of its members. The recognition of this group interest takes on both
substantive and procedural implications. Substantively, discrimination is established by showing that acts of discrimination have been
taken against the class to which plaintiff belongs. Procedurally,
plaintiff initiates a class action suit. Jurisprudentially, this area
affords an advanced example of the recognition given to the concept
of group interest, which was illuminated by Professor Cowan more
than a decade ago. 53
A third idea focuses on systems as subjects for legal regulation.
This concept has had a full development in labor relations and
labor law. The industrial-relations system involves the allocation,
functions, conditions, and compensation of employees in large-scale
enterprise. It has as one primary purpose the reduction of the areas
of individual discretion among managers and supervisors. For example, specific hiring procedures may prevent the local manager
from hiring his friends and assure distant top management of some
quality control over employees. A seniority system, likewise, stops
the foreman from playing favorites with promotions by requiring
49. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28
(1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 847 U.S. 17, 45-46 (1954).
50. 1 F. HARPER 8' F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 6.5-.13 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra
note 48, §§ 129-30.
51. Compare Jersey Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 765, 53 A. 230, 232
(1902):
A large part of what is most valuable in modern life seems to depend more or
less directly upon "probable expectancies." When they fail, civilization, as at
present organized, may go down. As social and industrial life develops and grows
more complex these "probable expectancies" are bound to increase. It would seem
inevitable that courts of law, as our system of jurisprudence is evolved to meet
the growing wants of an increasingly complex social order, will discover, define
and protect from undue interference more of these "probable expectancies."
52. "Discrimination by its very nature is directed against an entire class • • • ."
Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 125, 253 A.2d 793, 799 (1969).
53. Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. R.Ev. 331 (1958).
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him to give the job to the most senior man who possesses the qualifications for the position. All such systems leave room for individual
judgment of managers, but the hiring procedures themselves dictate
the initial parameters within which this judgment may be made.
Thus the personnel director will never have the chance to discriminate against a black youngster who never heard of the vacancy in
the first place, or whose score on the Wonderlic test knocked him
out of consideration for the job without an interview. Similarly, the
black steel worker seeking a promotion will not be rejected by the
foreman because of race, for that opening will be filled, instead,
through the operation of the seniority system by the most senior man
in the line of progression-who will probably be white.114
Finally, the principle of liberal construction of the statute is
relevant. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was aimed at "all
aspects of discrimination,'' 55 even though the Senate Committee that
issued the report using these words may not have known exactly what
they meant. Title VII was intended as a serious response to a major
social problem, and, for this reason, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission since 1965 has attempted to make the statute
effective in dealing with the social problem by giving it the broadest
possible construction. While doubters might have faltered and not
pressed issues to judicial decision, the Commission, during its first
years, moved in relation to the need. The issuance of the guidelines
and the development of the concept of written reasonable-cause decisions56 provided a body of law that has crystallized the concept that
discrimination should be defined in terms of consequence.57
54. For an illuminating discussion of this aspect of seniority systems, see United
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 448-55 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 906 (1972). See also S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971):
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated
and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some
identifiable individual or organization. It was thought that a scheme that stressed
conciliation rather than compulsory processes would be most appropriate for the
resolution of this essentially "human" problem, and that litigation would be
necessary only on an occasional basis. Experience has shown this view to be false.
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and pervasive
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem
in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the
literature on the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics
of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act
discriminatory practices through various institutional devices, and testing and
validation requirements.
55. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
56. One of the first written decisions finding reasonable cause to believe the Act
was violated is reprinted in Appendix A infra.
57. The United States Chamber of Commerce in a brief submitted as amicus curiae
in Griggs argued that this deliberate effort to extend the statute's scope was reason not
to give deference to the guidelines. (This argument is reproduced in Appendix B
infra.) In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court used the standard principle of
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The principle of liberal construction requires an anchor, which
for title VII purposes lies in section 703(a)(2).58 This provision makes
it unlawful for an employer to "adversely affect" an individual's employment status because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. The "adversely affect" language has an obscure genesis. It
was not part of the original New York fair employment law,59 and
thus presents a technically new point of departure for purposes of
statutory interpretation. It suggests that a court's focus of attention
should be more on the consequences of actions than on the actor's
state of mind.
With these four notions setting the legal background, government attorneys from the EEOC and Departments of Labor and
Justice pressed for acceptance of this third definition of discrimination. Gaining acceptance of this definition also became an integral
part of the litigation efforts of the NAACP and the Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc. Without the devoted and intelligent effort
of the many attorneys representing minorities and women, the legal
evolution that we are experiencing in this field could not have taken
place. The Supreme Court early recognized the importance of the
role of private counsel in civil rights litigation. It held that the
private litigant who brings suit under the 1964 Civil Rights Act acts
as a "private attorney general" by furthering the public interest;
thus, if he prevails, the litigant is ordinarily entitled to have his attorney fees paid by the defendant. 60 This position of the Court has
enhanced enforcement of the 1964 Act. Griggs, for example, was
litigated by the Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., a group
whose attorneys have forced the fundamental legal issue of discrimination to be sharply litigated and clearly decided.
The lower federal courts quickly grasped and applied this third
concept of discrimination. Their opinions reveal a sense of understanding of the consequences that flow from employment discrimination and a determination to provide an effective remedy for this
problem.61
deference to the expertise of an administrative agency. See text accompanying note 161
infra.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1970).
59. In 1945, New York enacted a law, [1945] N.Y. S=. Laws., ch. ll8, §§ 1-3 (codified
at N.Y. EXEc. I.Aw §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972)), which was the model for other state
enactments. M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 19.
60. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), so held in inter•
preting a section of title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). Title VII contains
a provision on attorneys' fees that is worded similarly. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
For an application of title VII's provision, see Lea v. Cone Mill Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th
Cir. 1971).
61. See cases cited in note 46 supra.
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Thus, an understanding of social need, the jurisprudential conception of protection for group interest, legal doctrines borrowed
from tort law, a statutory foundation, and the availability of counsel
all contributed to the building of a body of law adequate to ameliorate employment discrimination. These laid the foundation for the
full articulation of the third concept of discrimination by the Supreme Court. The elements of this concept had been generated and
tested in the interstices of administrative and judicial experience.
In the common law tradition, this new theory of discrimination was
suitable for promulgation as the law of the land. It came without the
fanfare of Brown,62 but without the bitter reaction also. 63

JV.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN GRIGGS

One of Duke Power's black employees who had a high school
diploma was promoted after a complaint was filed with the EEOC
but before suit was instituted. 64 This may be taken as the extent of
"voluntary compliance" under informal legal pressure. After the
filing of suit under title VII in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina, the two other black employees with high school diplomas were promoted. 65 This action must
have been taken on advice of counsel who knew what was needed to
protect the interests of the company in the litigation. After all, the
only explanation for these men being in the black department after
July 2, 1965, once vacancies had arisen, was their race. Refusal to
transfer or promote them would have perpetuated the deliberate
racial assignment. Under the evil-motive test, these acts constituted
discrimination.
Duke Power's counsel had correctly anticipated the view of the
district court. The district court applied the evil-motive concept of
discrimination to the entire case. The court looked for acts taking
place after July 2, 1965, that were motivated by racial animus such
as the pre-July 2 act of placing black workers in the labor department
because that is where blacks "belonged."66 Since the black high
school graduates had been promoted, the court found no discrimina62. :Brown v. :Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. Compare :Bacon, Of Innovations, in FRANCIS :BACON'S ~Ys 74 (Everyman's
Library ed. 1906):
It were good therefore that men in their innovations would follow the example
of time itself, which indeed innovateth greatly, but quietly and by degrees scarce
to be perceived: for otherwise, whatsoever is new is unlooked for; and ever it mends
some, and pairs other: and he that is holpen takes it for a fortune, and thanks the
time; and he that is hurt, for a wrong, and imputeth it to the author.
64. See note 28 supra.
65, Id.
66. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 247-51 (1968).
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tion at all. 67 The hiring and testing procedures appeared to the court
as rational management techniques for securing the best-qualified
employees.68 Plaintiff's argument that these procedures had to be
job-related was dismissed because such a requirement was not, in
itself, a part of the statute.69 Plaintiff also argued that the EEOC
guidelines required employment tests to be job-related; but since
plaintiff never established discrimination, the requirement that the
test be job-related was, in the court's view, simply an abstract recommendation of a federal agency, which the district court felt free to
ignore.70
Unlike the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit applied the second concept of discrimination. Regardless of
e..vil motive, the court held that the company's different treatment of
similarly situated black and white employees constituted discrimination.71 White employees hired before 1955 who had earned no high
school diploma had been able during the years to transfer and be
promoted into higher paying positions. Black employees had been
confined to the labor department. To treat the black employees
equally, it was now necessary to permit those hired before 1955 to
transfer and be promoted without regard to the high school standard
or the testing requirement. Otherwise, the unequal treatment of
black and white employees from the pre-1955 period would be perpetuated. The court, therefore, concluded that treatment must not
be equalized and that the group of black employees in question must
be allowed to transfer and be promoted without any more strenuous
conditions than those placed upon similarly situated white employees; that is, those hired before 1955.
This was the "equal treatment" concept, and, in applying it, the
court of appeals indicated, as have other courts,72 that it would
remedy the effects of past discrimination. Yet, the only discrimination identified by the equal-treatment test was that involving the
racial assignment of blacks to the labor department before 1955.
Blacks without high school diplomas who were hired into the labor
department after 1955 were not denied equal treatment because there
were no "simHarly situated" white employees. All white employees
hired after 1955 had high school educations. Since all the black em67. 292 F. Supp. at 251.
68. 292 F. Supp. at 248, 250.
69, See 292 F. Supp. at 250.
70. 292 F. Supp. at 250.
71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1230-31 (1970).
72. See, e.g., Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F,2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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ployees with high school diplomas had been promoted, the equaltreatment concept did not help the Griggs plaintiffs. In addition,
there was no evil-motive discrimination practiced against them after
1965.
Before the Fourth Circuit, plaintiffs again tried to strengthen
their case by relying on the Commission guidelines which required
tests to be job-related.73 But the court of appeals majority was unimpressed. Since no discrimination had been found, 74 the EEOC's
requirement that tests be job-related appeared to the court as being
aimed not at discrimination, but instead at a concern by the EEOC
that tests in general be fair. To the majority, the EEOC's position
seemed too close to one (concerning testing) that had been rejected
by the Congress.75 Thus, the court concluded that the job-related
requirement was beyond the power of the EEOC.
The sole dissenter on the Fourth Circuit, Judge Sobeloff, formulated a definition of discrimination that foreshadowed the unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court in Griggs. Relying on the nowfamous language of Judge Butzer in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,76
that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of
Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before
the act," 77 Judge Sobeloff suggested that any practices having this
effect are discriminatory. 78 In light of this judgment, his review of
the job-relatedness requirement of the EEOC led him to give deference to the agency charged with administering the Act.79 Moreover,
his dissent makes clear his motivation for accepting the third concept
of discrimination. In his words, the issue presented by Griggs was
"whether the Act shall remain a potent tool for equalization of employment opportunity or shall be reduced to mellifluous but hollow
rhetoric." 80 He concluded:
73. 420 F.2d at 1231,
74. 420 F.2d at 1232-33.
75. 420 F.2d at 1233-35.
The testing provision had been written into title VII as a result of the decision in
1964 of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission in Myart v. Motorola, Inc.,
No. 636-27, reprinted in llO CONG. REc. 5662 (1964), modified sub nom. Motorola, Inc.
v. FEPC, 58 L.R.R.M. 2573 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1965), reud., 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286
(1966). Many interpreted this decision as banning any test which adversely affected
blacks without regard to business need. See generally Cooper&: Sobel, supra note 17, at
1649-54; Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM, L. R.Ev. 691, 707-10 (1968).
76. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
77, 420 F.2d at 1247, quoting 279 F. Supp. at 516.
78, 420 F.2d at 1247-48.
79. 420 F.2d at 1239-44.
80, 420 F.2d at 1237-38.
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This case deals with no mere abstract legal question. It confronts
us with one of the most vexing problems touching racial justice and
tests the integrity and credibility of the legislative and judicial process. We should approach our task of enforcing Title VII with full
realization of what is at stake.81

The Supreme Court took Judge Sobeloff's point seriously. Chief
Justice Burger, recognizing that the case was one of first impression,
proceeded to define discrimination as follows:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices.
The Court of Appeals' opinion, and the partial dissent, agreed
that, on the record in the present case, "whites register far better on
the Company's alternative requirements" than Negroes. . . . This
consequence would appear to be directly traceable to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly
in a testing process. Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long
received inferior education in segregated schools .•.• Congress did
not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that
any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of
discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference £or any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria £or employment
or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the
sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the £ox. On the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition of
the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to resort again to the
fable-provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one
all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
On the record before us, neither the high school completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demon81. 420 F.2d at 1248. See also Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 5!16
(E.D. La. 1970).
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strable relationship to successful performance of the jobs £or which
it was used. Both were adopted, as the Court of Appeals noted, without meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance ability.
Rather, a vice president of the Company testified, the requirements
were instituted on the Company's judgment that they generally
would improve the over-all quality of the work force.
The evidence, however, shows that employees who have not completed high school or taken the tests have continued to perform satisfactorily and make progress in departments £or which the high school
and test criteria are now used. The promotion record of present
employees who would not be able to meet the new criteria thus
suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed
even £or the limited purpose of preserving the avowed policy of advancement within the Company. In the context of this case, it is
unnecessary to reach the question whether testing requirements that
take into account capability £or the next succeeding position or related future promotion might be utilized upon a showing that such
long-range requirements fulfill a genuine business need. In the present case the Company has made no such showing.
The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted the
diploma and test requirements without any "intention to discriminate against Negro employees." ... We do not suggest that either
the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the
employer's intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate as "built-in headwinds" £or minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability.
The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by
special efforts to help the under-educated employees through the
Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition £or high school
training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More
than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship
to the employment in question.
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and
general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or
degrees as fixed measures of capability. History is filled with examples of men and women who rendered highly effective performance
without the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of
certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the common sense proposition that
they are not to become masters of reality.82

All of the concepts we have discussed come into play in the Supreme Court's opinion: the objective of achieving equality and the
necessity that such equality be real; the need to eliminate barriers
82. 401 U.S. at 429-33.
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unless justified by business necessity and the consequences of failing
to meet the business necessity test; the rejection of the evil-motive
test and the shift of the burden of proof to the employer once it is
found that the consequences of the employer's conduct adversely
affect minorities.
The importance of this new concept of discrimination was underscored by the roles in the opinion of the job-relatedness concept,
the EEOC guidelines, and the testing provision of title VII. All
were viewed quite differently than in the lower courts. There, these
factors were considered as part of plaintiffs case of discrimination.
In the Supreme Court's opinion, they were viewed as part of defendant's case of justification because a prima facie case of discrimination was established without reliance on these factors.
The Supreme Court found discrimination because the diploma
and test requirements screened out a higher proportion of minorities
than of whites. These facts alone established the prima facie case of
discrimination, and there was no need for plaintiffs to rely on the
testing guidelines. Having made this finding of discrimination, the
Court viewed the testing issue as a matter for the defense. Defendant
argued that it was privileged under title VII's testing proviso to use
tests for "general ability" that were "professionally developed" without demonstrating any relation to the work in question.83 This was
one of the arguments that Holbert and I had been unable to overcome back in 1966, before the issuance of the guidelines. Defendant
also argued in the Supreme Court that the guidelines went beyond
the bounds permitted by the statute.84 The Court, having concluded
that discrimination was bounded by the justification of business
necessity, viewed the EEOC guidelines as spelling out the details of
business necessity in testing situations, and upheld the Commission's
interpretation of title VII.85
At this point, a review of the effect of the legal process on the
situation at Duke Power Company is in order. The statute's passage,
without the invocation of any formal procedures, led to a change in
the entry level and transfer standards, but no black workers were
hired, promoted, or transferred into the more desirable departments
or positions. Once the EEOC complaint had been filed, the company
upgraded one black worker who had a high school diploma. After the
district court proceedings had been commenced, the remaining two
black workers with high school diplomas were promoted. The dis83. Brief for Respondent at 46-52, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
84. Id. at 52.
85. 401 U.S. at 438-34.
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trict court therefore concluded that its concept of discrimination
(evil-motive) had not been proven.
The court of appeals ordered priority for promotion and transfer
of the six black workers who had been hired before 1955. That much
was required by its equal-treatment concept of discrimination. The
Supreme Court decision extended that priority to all of the remaining black employees, and struck down the high school and test requirements as applied to minority applicants. This re.fleets the reach
of the statute under the Supreme Court's concept of discrimination.
It involves a more extensive re-examination of both the conditions
of incumbent blacks and the hiring standards than the other two
concepts would require.
V.

THE SCOPE OF THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE

The legal issues concerning testing have been exhaustively analyzed elsewhere.86 The nature of the discussion and controversy
surrounding testing is shaped by the underlying concept of discrimination. The testing proviso of title VII, as Chief Justice Burger
pointed out by the use of italics, has a self-limiting feature, for professionally developed ability tests can be relied upon for personnel
decisions only if they are not "designed, intended or used to discriminate."87 Since discrimination is to be measured by effect and
since the tests as applied to minorities do have the proscribed effect,
the testing proviso appears inapplicable in its own terms.88
The EEOC interpretation of the testing proviso was designed to
deal inter alia with the employer defense that tests measuring "general abilities and aptitudes" that are not related to the particular job
or group of jobs for which the minority applicant is being considered
may be used, even after title VII's enactment. Griggs, however, by
upholding the EEOC's conclusion that tests must bear a more intimate relation to the necessities of the work than that provided under
the rubric of "general abilities and aptitudes," adequately disposed
86. E.g., A. BLUMROSEN, supra note l, at 255-69; Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employers, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 901 (1972);
Cooper & Sobel, supra note 17; Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts,
58 VA. L. REv. 844 (1972): Note, supra note 75.
87. 401 U.S. at 433, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
88. This "self-limiting'' feature is a characteristic of the several provisions that were
adopted as part of the compromise that led to the passage of the 1964 Act. See 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(h), (j) (1970). The opponents of the legislation would propose an amendment
which the supporters would find objectionable. The supporters would then add qualifying language which would make the provision inoperative if discrimination was
found. See generally A. BLUMROSEN, supra note l, at 182-85 (seniority), 251-52 (quotas),
265-66 (testing).
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of this argument. This argument by the employer that a standard of
business convenience should govern was too close to the proposition
that wrongdoers should be permitted to establish their own standards
of conduct, an argument long rejected by the common law of negligence.89 It is now clear that the standards of necessity under title
VII are to be judicially established, after a careful scrutiny of the
situation, so that conduct having an adverse effect on minorities will
not be permitted simply because it would be more convenient for the
employer. Often, it was business convenience that created the practices that proved harmful to minorities in the first place. It would
be a meaningless gesture to characterize such practices as discrimination and then to permit them to be continued under the business
necessity privilege. To implement the concept that discrimination
consists of conduct adversely affecting minorities, it is essential for
courts to fashion a narrow and carefully limited test of business
necessity. This is precisely what adoption of the EEOC guidelines
accomplished.
The language and the legislative history of section 703(e) 90 supports this approach. That section permits conduct otherwise prohibited "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise
...." On its face, section 703(e) does not extend the occupational
qualification privilege to permit racial discrimination, and the legislative reports make clear that the omission of the word "race" from
this provision was done purposefully. The bill as reported by the
House Judiciary Committee did not include race as a possible bona
fide occupational qualification,91 and Congressman Williams' attempt
to amend the bill on the House floor to include race was defeated.92
89. "Even an entire industry, by adopting such careless methods to save time, effort
or money, cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard." W. PROSSER, supra
note 48, § 33, at 167, citing Shafer v. H.B. Thomas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 19, 146 A.2d 48!1
(1958).
A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 181-82 discusses the same concept in connection with
discrimination in seniority systems.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
91. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 704(e) (1964). The Committee's report stated
that the bona fide occupational qualification "provides for a very limited exception to
the provisions of the title. Notwithstanding any other provisions, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to employ persons of a particular religion
or national origin in those rare situations where religion or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (196!1), in
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMN., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLl!S VII AND
XI OF CrvIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 2027 (1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
92. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 2550 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 8191-92.
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In the Senate, Senator McClellan tried the same approach. 93 He explained that his proposal would permit racial considerations in
employment
when the employer believes, on the basis of substantial evidence,
that the hiring of such an individual of a particular race ... would
be more beneficial to the normal operations of his particular business
or to its good will than the hiring of an individual of another particular race •.••
. . . The present provisions of the bill constitute an infringement
on personal liberty, denying to the employer the right to exercise
his judgment in his own business affairs as to whom he might employ to help him carry on his business and whom he might employ
to make the business more prosperous.94'
Senator Case, a proponent of the 1964 Act, responded:
The issue is clearly drawn by this amendment. The Senator from
Arkansas does not believe in the FEPC title of the bill and would
eliminate them, in effect, by the provisions of his amendment. I think
there is no question about that.
We who believe in fair employment practices and the intervention of the Federal Government in this field ... must resist the
amendment of the Senator from Arkansas with all our power, because it would destroy the bill.95
Senator McClellan's proposed amendment was defeated, 30 to 61.96
While the fears of opponents are not necessarily to be read into the
statute if they lose, it is clear that the precise issue, whether managerial prerogatives and business convenience would be subordinated
to the need to eliminate racial discrimination, was confronted and
rejected by both houses of Congress. It is therefore simply not a
defense under title VII for an employer to argue that conduct that
constitutes racial discrimination, as defined in Griggs, is justified as
reasonably necessary to the normal operations of his business.
This analysis supports the narrow scope of justification adopted
in Griggs and resolves the "policy questions" that the academic
literature seeks to keep alive. 97 Congressional judgment on this matter, of course, is conclusive.
In cases decided since Griggs, the courts have proceeded along the
path of limited justification. In Robinson v. Lorrilard Corp.,98
Judge Sobeloff, writing for a now unanimous court, held:
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

R.Ec. 13825 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 3183.
R.Ec. 13825 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HlSToRY, supra note 91, at 3183.
CONG. REc. 13826 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 3184.
CoNG. REc. 13826 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 3185.
See, e.g., Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235 (1971).
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
110
110
110
110
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[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business
purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the
practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to
override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must
be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which
would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.99
Judge Sobeloff's view was carried one step further in Johnson v.
Pike Corp. of America,100 which held that a company rule providing
for discharge in the event of successive wage garnishments was invalid because of its discriminatory effect on minority employees. On
the justification issue, the company arguments concerning time and
expense involved in garnishment procedures were rejected; the court
considered these to be a price that Congress indicated must be paid to
end discrimination.101 The argument that the worker would become
less productive if he were under garnishment was dismissed as speculative.102 The court concluded, "The ability of the individual effectively and efficiently to carry out his assigned duties is, therefore, the
only justification recognized by the law."103
The question of justification can be analyzed in this way when
dealing with formal company policies relating to testing, education,
arrests, or garnishments. It can also be applied with respect to recruitment and seniority systems that exclude minorities, and even to
corporate decisions such as plant location. But the vast bulk of personnel decisions that determine a worker's future are made within
a much more fluid framework. Initial-employment, promotion, discharge, and discipline decisions also take place under rubrics such
as "best qualified" or "just cause." How these decisions will be
viewed by the courts under title VII when the employer's personnel
system discriminates within the meaning of Griggs is a much more
difficult problem.
The internal tension within the Griggs decision will provide the
fighting ground for the next round of cases. As Griggs holds, dis99. 444 F.2d at 798. See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418,
451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (management convenience and
business necessity not synonymous); United States v. :Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
652 (2d Cir. 1971).
100. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
101. 332 F. Supp. at 495-96.
102. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
103. 332 F. Supp. at 496.
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crimination is conduct which has an adverse effect on minority employees as a class. Yet, at the same time, the Court stated that the law
does not provide "that any person be hired simply because .•. he is
a member of a minority group.... Congress has not commanded that
the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins."104 These statements from Griggs raise
the all-important question of the relationship between a finding of
class discrimination and the granting of relief to individual members
of that class in a particular case. The possibilities for confession and
avoidance in this situation are substantial. A respondent may, because of the strength of the "consequences" rule, admit that he has
discriminated and then argue that the complainant or other individual members of the minority group should not benefit from remedies
that would correct the discrimination. Presumably, the argument
will present "good reasons" based on normal industrial criteria of
performance and discipline for denying employment opportunity to
the particular individual. For example, the respondent will contend
that the majority group person was "better qualified" than a rejected
minority group person who has the basic qualifications to do the
work. Indeed, this contention has already been raised successfully in
one state administrative proceeding. The Maryland Commission of
Human Relations found discriminatory practices in recruitment, but
refused to apply that finding to benefit an individual complainant.105
In Jacksonville Terminal,1° 6 the Fifth Circuit considered the
104. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431, 436.
105. Jones v. American Totalisator Co., FEP 70-796 (Md. Commn. Human Relations
1971), copy of decision on file with the Michigan Law Review. The respondent was
found to have used a discriminatory recruitment and hiring system that relied on wordof-mouth referrels and walk-ins at a plant in a white geographic area with an almost
all-white work force. The company was ordered to use a nondiscriminatory method of
recruitment. However, the Commission gave no relief to the complainant on the
ground that no discrimination was proved in the failure to hire him. Several whites
were also passed over, when a friend of a supervisor was given the job. Since both
complainant and the other whites had more experience than the white who got the
job, the Commission concluded there was no racial discrimination. Thus, the Commission s¾itched from the adverse-effects test that it had used to judge the recruitment
system and instead used an equal-treatment test when considering the complainant's
case. This failure to follow the adverse-effects test in the individual case could, if
followed by other decisions, render a finding of discrimination in the recruitment and
hiring system a bare abstraction, with no "bite" into actual employment practices.
But compare Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 679 (W.D. Mich.
1971), afjd. per curiam, 457 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972). The court held that statistical evidence that suggested discrimination in recruiting was relevant in resolving credibility
issues concerning alleged discrimination in a denial of a request for transfer from a
qualified black applicant. The court's liuk between recruiting and transferring was that
the company employed the same processes in handling both activities.
106. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
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proof-of-discrimination question in two situations: first, with respect
to restrictions on promotion and transfer opportunities of incumbent
minority employees; and second, in the context of initial employment. The court rejected the company's desire to promote the "most
qualified" employee107 because this policy would have perpetuated
the effects of past minority subordination. It held that the company
could not refuse to promote an otherwise eligible minority employee if he had "sufficient" ability to do the job.108 The employer
was prohibited from applying a "best qualified" standard. However,
the court permitted the company to use a "best qualified" standard
in connection with newly hired employees even though the result
was to perpetuate a pattern of white hiring.109
This latter holding may represent a departure from the Griggs
principle. In requiring that the government prove that black applicants for employment had qualifications equal or superior to white
applicants,11° the court appeared to apply the equal-treatment concept of discrimination, rather than the adverse-effect concept. However, the case is not clear on this point since the government failed
to prove that minority applicants possessed any level of qualifications
to do the work or that minority qualifications were more limited
than the white applicants' as a result of a discriminatory hiring system. Because of this failure of proof, the court did not squarely face
the issue of whether an employer who has discriminated against minority group members, either through an assignment or seniority
system or through recruitment and hiring practices, may reject a
qualified minority applicant because his white applicants are "better
qualified."
The decision does highlight the importance of establishing a link
between discriminatory practices that have harmed a class of minorities and the claims of individual minority applicants that they have
been improperly denied employment opportunities. If this connection cannot be established, then the Griggs principle may be limited
to protection of incumbent employees only and will not work for the
benefit of applicants for employment who are members of the group
which was discriminated against.
If the Griggs principle, as applied by a "private attorney general,"
yields no remedy when qualified minority applicants appear for employment by an employer who has discriminated, title VII will be
107.
108.
109.
110.

451
451
451
451
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F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
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448-55.
458-60.
443-48.
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of limited effectiveness. Failure to provide meaningful relief was
the reason why the Whitfield111 case put an end to efforts to enforce
the doctrine of the Steele case,112 which stated that a union has a
duty to represent minority employees fairly. Whitfield upheld a collective bargaining agreement requiring that senior black employees
take a cut in pay and a loss of job security, and assume junior positions in previously white departments in order to transfer to such
departments. This made the Steele doctrine a dead letter.113
How then can an individual complainant obtain the benefit of a
finding of discrimination against the class to which he belongs?
There are two possible approaches to this problem. First, and at the
least, a finding of class discrimination should create a presumption
that complainant individually suffered an adverse effect from that
discrimination. A prima facie case would be based either on the inference that the discriminatory system had in fact adversely affected
plaintiff or on the grounds of respondents' doubtful credibility because of their discriminatory practices. Either form of reasoning
must be rooted in a rational connection between the class discrimination and the harm to plaintiff. The burden of persuasion would then
shift to the defendant who must demonstrate that the adverse action
was based on business necessity, was carefully tailored to the precise
peculiarities of the immediate situation, and did not involve any residual elements of the operation of a discriminatory system.114 In
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,11 5 the Eighth Circuit moved
toward this position. There, the court stated,
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications
to fill a job opening and that he was denied a job, we think he presents a prim a f acie case of racial discrimination and that the burden
passes to the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of the job.116

What is left open by the court, of course, are the questions whether
McDonnell Douglas would have prevailed if it had established that
111. Whitfield v. Steelworkers, Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 902 (1959).
112. Steele v. Louisville 8: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
113. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly rejected Whitfield's reasoning in title VII
cases. Taylor v. ARMCO Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (1970).
114. Compare the approach taken in Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 679 (W.D. Mich. 1971), affd. per curiam, 457 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972) (discussed in
note 105 supra).
115. 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 577 (March 30, 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.LW. 3312
(U.S., Dec. 5, 1972).
116. 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 583.
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another applicant was "better qualified" and what standards must
be met to prove better qualification. At any rate, Green does impose
the burden of proving the best-qualified defense upon the employer.
This shift itself may achieve substantial results for minorities, particularly in light of the analysis in the Fifth Circuit's recent decision
in Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,111 which rejected the use of subjective standards for promotion in face of a statistical demonstration
that minorities were excluded from supervisory positions. The court
evidently felt that after a showing by the plaintiff of class discrimination and of some qualification for the job, the "best-qualified" defense
is available, but the employer has the burden of proving it, and his
credibility will be viewed cautiously.118
Thus, as the law stands at present, if the minority person is refused employment by an employer who has used a discriminatory
recruitment system, the employer may defend on the grounds that
the minority person lacks the capacity to perform the work. If the
employer wishes to argue that he preferred to have a better-qualified
employee, at the least he must bear the burden of proof and show
that the employee hired was better qualified by objective standards
to do the job. This conclusion is consistent with the point made in
Griggs that less-qualified applicants need not be favored119 and with
Jacksonville Terminal's reasoning. Yet, it also leaves the employer
with the burden cast upon him by the adverse-effects test of Griggs.
An alternative line of analysis would conclude that the "hire the
best qualified" argument is simply not available while the effects of
discrimination persist and while minority applicants have the basic
qualifications necessary to do the work. This was the approach taken
in Jacksonville Terminal with respect to incumbents and in the
Newport News conciliation effort with respect to promotions to
supervisory positions.120 Such an analysis appears at odds with the
language quoted from Griggs against favoring less-qualified minority
applicants. This language can be construed as applicable to situations in which there has not been a finding of discrimination or the
effects of past discrimination have been eliminated. It can be argued
117. 457 F.2d 348 (1972).
US. See 457 F.2d at 358-59. This reasoning was explicitly adopted in Cooper v.
Allen, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1219 (5th Cir., Aug. 29, 1972), brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970), which held that once it has been determined that a minority applicant
was denied employment by virtue of a standard illegal under Griggs, that applicant is
entitled to back pay unless the employer can demonstrate that the person employed was
the most qualified.
ll9. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
120. A copy of the Newport News agreement can be found in A. BLUMROSEN, supra
note I, at 367-77.
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that only when the headwinds against minorities have dissipated
may the employer resort to the best-qualified principle to reject a
qualified minority applicant.
It is important to preserve the principle of qualifications for
reasons to be discussed below;121 yet it is also important, as Griggs
itself notes, not to allow the qualifications concept to be used to
perpetuate patterns of discrimination. Either of the analyses suggested here will accomplish both objectives.

VJ.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The generating principles in Griggs-that discrimination is defined by adverse consequences to minorities as a group and that the
right to be free from such discrimination runs to the benefit of members of the group unless the respondent can justify his actions-have
ramifications in several directions.
A.

Class Actions

The right to bring a class action to express the group interest of
minorities is woven so intimately into the Griggs opinion122 that one
might think such a right is set forth in title VII. Except for those
provisions that authorize EEOC Commissioners to file charges of discrimination and authorize the Attorney General to sue if there is
injury to a group,123 the statute is silent on the issue. Yet, in creating
a federal cause of action, Congress necessarily invoked the broad body
of federal procedural law incident to federal jurisdiction, which, of
course, would include class actions in this type of case.124 The 1972
amendments to title VII implicitly accept the concept of class actions
by permitting charges to be filed with the EEOC "by or on behalf
of" aggrieved parties.125
The district court, at the close of the Griggs trial, held that the
class covered by the judgment included "those Negroes presently
employed, and who subsequently may be employed, at the Dan River
Steam Station and all Negroes who may hereafter seek employment
at the station.''126 This finding was not further reviewed, since both
121. Pt. VIII infra.
122. "Congress provided, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for class actions
for enforcement of provisions of the Act ••••" 401 U.S. at 426.
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a),-6(a) (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4-5, 86 Stat. 104.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
125. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat.
104.
126. 292 F. Supp. at 244.
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the court of appeals and the Supreme Court dealt explicitly with
only the plight of the employed black persons. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's holding implicitly covers not only the incumbent
employees who were the immediate focus of the actions, but all
minority applicants for employment as well. Griggs, therefore, suggests that title VII class actions aimed at practices that promote discrimination against incumbent minorities may also reach practices
that adversely affect minority applicants for employment.

B. "Northern-Style" Discrimination
"Northern-style" discrimination, to which I have given considerable attention elsewhere,127 involves the combination of the southern pattern of assigning minorities to lower-paying positions with
the northern pattern of total minority exclusion from many employment situations.128 This result is accomplished through the use
of recruitment systems in which the segregated nature of social and
housing patterns influences the color of the work force. In these systems, the mechanism for notifying potential employees about job
openings is frequently word-of-mouth referral by friends and relatives who are apt to be of the same color. The legal problem here
involves the scope of the duty of fair recruitment. What says Griggs
on this question?
The decision speaks to cases in which "barriers ... have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees."129 The situation before the Court involved the
classic southern pattern in which whites were given preferences over
black employees with more seniority because of race. However, the
rationale of the case reaches all actions by employers having an adverse effect on minority employment opportunity, even though no
history of overt discrimination may exist. Evidence of past overt discrimination in a title VII case can serve at least two purposes: It may
prove that the employer had a discriminatory intent at some point
in time, and it may show that the present plight of employees is the
consequence of actions based upon that discriminatory intent. Now
that the consequence test of discrimination has replaced the intent
test, these reasons for evidence of past discrimination are no longer
important. It is sufficient to show that employment practices restrict
127. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 218-70. For an example of northern-style discrimination (practiced, ironically, in Arkansas), see Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F .2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
129. 401 U.S. at 430.
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minority employment opportunities as compared to those open to the
majority. Thus, the rationale of Griggs reaches situations in which
there has never been a history of overt discrimination and supports
the duty of fair recruitment and, I think also, the duty to plan for
equal employment opportunities in connection with plant location
and other matters.180
C.

The Use of Statistics in Making a Prima Facie Case

Statistics may be used to demonstrate the existence of an adverse
effect, or "built-in headwind,"131 against minorities, and may thus
force the defendant to justify those policies which contributed to his
poor minority employment record. The issue in these cases is when
do statistics shift the burden of going forward to the defendant?
Frequently, the "real grounds" for finding liability are adduced
from evidence given by the employer's own witnesses. These "real
grounds" are often legal constructs, created after the evidence is in.
The plaintiff may guess at what defendant did wrong and attack
these actions as discriminatory. His proof consists of statistics showing
a failure to hire or promote minority persons plus identification
of the acts and practices by defendant that may have produced the
statistics. Full disclosure of the operations of defendant may be forthcoming only during defendant's testimony, and consequently this
evidence will become available only if the court requires defendant
to present this proof; otherwise, defendant will prevail on a motion
for a directed verdict after plaintiff has finished presenting his case.
If the entire picture is presented before the court, however, the
operative factors that produced the prima facie discrimination statistics may be identified and the defendant's claims of justification
with respect to each element in the situation evaluated. The use of
statistics may thus be well suited to securing a full judicial scrutiny
of defendant's employment practices-a scrutiny necessary if title
VII is to be effective.
The relation between the statistics and the practices of defendant
is one of probability. Thus, in Griggs, the proof that the high school
diploma was a "headwind" against minorities was provided by statistics demonstrating the general educational level in North Carolina,
while the proof that the Wonderlic test excluded minorities was
130. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (suit alleging discrimination
in police recruitment, brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970)). See generally A.
BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 218-70; Blumrosen, The Duty To Plan for Fair Employment: Plant Location in White Suburbia, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 383 (1971).
131. 401 U.S. at 432.
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found in the EEOC's reasonable-cause finding in the Louisiana paper
company case.132
The Court did not require proof that the Duke Power Company
had in fact turned down three times as many black applicants as
whites or that blacks had failed the Wonderlic test at the Duke
Power plant nine times as frequently as whites. Such proof may not
have existed at all, or if it did exist, may have involved such small
numbers of persons as to be insignificant. The Court utilized evidence of the effect of the diploma and test requirements based on
probability and experience in other places.
If the Court had required proof of an adverse effect of the test
or diploma requirements in the particular case, the principle of the
Griggs case could only be applied to the specific hiring practice or
procedure which barred minority opportunity. Thus, a discriminatory-recruitment case might yield a finding of discrimination only
with respect to initial recruiting procedures, but not with respect to
hiring qualification standards that had not been tested by minority
applicants because they had never applied for employment or had
been rebuffed at the front gate, and thus never reached the testing
table.
This approach would produce the ultimate frustration of piecemeal litigation concerning the employer's hiring process, and would
require successive litigation over each stage in the hiring and employment process. This result would stultify the implementation of
title VII. It was carefully avoided by the Supreme Court.
There are at least two types of statistical evidence available to
plaintiff that will force defendant to justify his activities: (1) proof
that particular employment standards will exclude a higher proportion of minorities than of the majority group, and (2) proof that 1:he
composition of defendant's labor force is itself reflective of restrictive
or exclusionary practices. Griggs, with its challenge to diplomas and
tests that reflect the inferior position of minorities in society, serves
as an illustration of statistical proof under the first heading. Under
the second heading falls statistical evidence showing the employment
patterns of defendant; where this evidence shows restriction or exclusion, the defendant also must come forward with explanation and
justification. With respect to this type of proof, the courts have expressed some reservations regarding the use of statistics in proving
discrimination.133 I believe the courts are wisely avoiding a rigid
132. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977, 992 (W.D.N.Y.
1970), afjd., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
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stance. The cases coming before them now are cases of gross disparity
which clearly indicate that the defendant has not dealt fairly with
minorities. But at some point the courts may begin to insist on
further proof of discrimination by plaintiff and may not want this
option foreclosed by overly general statements.134

D. Statistics and Remedy
Once discrimination is found, the remedy must destroy the adverse effect on minorities as rapidly as possible, while leaving a
degree of flexibility in the implementation of the corrective measures. In the case of discriminatory failures to recruit and hire, the
courts have properly required defendants to use a numerical standard for hiring minorities. This numerical standard might require
that one of two, or one of three, future new employees be members
of the class previously subjected to discrimination.
Carter v. Gallagher135 is the most important precedent on the
matter of numerical standards. There, the court flatly rejected a
"hire minority workers exclusively" proposal as unduly interfering
with other interests, but, after further consideration, the court did
hold that a one-in-three minority-hiring ratio would be acceptable.136
134. See Pennsylvania v O'Neill, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286 (3d Cir. Sept. 14,
1972). See also the discussion in pt. VII infra.
135. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (suit brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), but title VII remedies offered a "practical guide'').
136. 452 F.2d at 330-31. This Article is not the place for an extended discussion of
constitutional questions concerning numerical standards or other specific remedies for
discrimination that will provide meaningful employment opportunities for minorities.
Some elementary comments are in order:
1. The optimum remedy is one that does not pit worker against worker, but
rather gives minorities or women opportunities that do not detract from those of the
majority. This concept of a nonzero sum game is not always possible in the struggle
for scarce jobs.
2. There is no constitutional right on the part of the "most qualified" person to a
job or promotion in private employment. We have never constitutionalized rights to
employment opportunities. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exerdse of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1404 (1967).
Except when restricted by statute or contract, an employer remains free to hire or
promote for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Public employers, on the
other hand, may function under a more vigorous standard judicially imposed by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments • .But this standard requires only that the public
employer not be arbitrary or use invidious classifications. The public employer has a
wide range of optional employment policies under this standard and is not required
to hire the most qualified. See Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
3, The white male majority has no legitimate expectation that patterns or practices
that adversely affected minorities or women will continue to benefit them.
4. In imposing a remedy under a statute such as title VII, the courts are free
to shape such relief in a manner that will correct the injustice suffered by plaintiff
and the appropriate class, abolish the illegal practice, and assure that it will not recur.
They may not impose sanctions that are "punitive." Cf. Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB,
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While somewhat reminiscent of the conversation concerning price
and principle between George Bernard Shaw and the lady, the
Carter case does, I think, point the way through the maze of "quota"
and "preferential treatment" talk. It suggests: (1) The use of numerical standards to increase minority hiring is an appropriate remedy
for discrimination. (2) Those standards must have a degree of flexibility-the court will not order all vacancies saved for minorities.
(3) The order will only operate until the defendant demonstrates
that his system is acting fairly; 137 at that point the chancellor's foot
will be lifted from the defendant's neck.
All of these propositions are compatible with a larger vision
of how the courts can, in a manner consistent with judicial traditions
and in concert with other institutions of government, destroy the
pattern of discrimination in employment. This point will be discussed further below.138
VII.

"POWER" OF THE

EEOC

A scholar who was finishing a book on employment discrimination when title VII was passed characterized the EEOC as a "poor
enfeebled thing." 139 Professor Sovern was reacting, along with many
365 U.S. 651 (1961). This, rather than the Constitution, is the appropriate legal frame.
work for discussion of the problem. It is obvious that the majority must stand aside
while discrimination is being remedied in situations of scarcity where there is no
other alternative. This result poses no constitutional question. The issue of "how far
aside" the majority must stand is closely related to the issue of how quickly will the
discrimination be remedied. That question is for the judiciary, which must interpret
the scope and reach of title VII. In this framework Carter (one of three), Local 53,
Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (one of two), Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (one of three), Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 4 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 1972) (one of three is inappropriate if the
pool from which minorities are to be drawn is not composed of qualified persons),
have already hammered out the formulas to be used in shaping remedies under the
statute. The "constitutional talk" in some of these cases is, in my view, a way of
discussing wise judicial policy under the statute to end the effect of discriminatory
practices as rapidly as possible without "freezing" majority employment opportunities.
As long as the courts focus on these issues, there is no constitutional question in
affording a meaningful remedy for discrimination against minority group individuals.
The arguments cast in constitutional terms appear to be revisions of the ancient
and discredited arguments for "going slow," using "education," and not trying to
solve social problems "overnight." We have paid a terrible human price for listening
too closely to those arguments. The kernel of wisdom in them has been buried in the
rhetoric of the status quo. That status quo is now unacceptable. This is the meaning
of Griggs. The courts are doing a competent job at the moment of identifying the
rate of minority and female advance that they believe will both reduce the "head·winds" and be, at least grudgingly, acceptable to the policy makers and to society. For
the judges who hammered out the one-of-three formula in Carter v. Gallagher,
there could be no constitutional talisman, only the lonely task of judgment.
137. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970).
138. Pt. VIII infra.
139. M. SOVERN, supra note 2, at 205.
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other civil rights supporters, to the gutting of the administrative
procedure that they believed important to combat employment discrimination. They wished to give the EEOC administrative-hearing
and cease-and-desist-order power similar to that possessed by the
National Labor Relations Board. This approach was stricken from
the original bill in a congressional compromise.140 Instead, the Commission was given the power to investigate, find reasonable cause,
and attempt to conciliate. If it failed, then either the complainant
or the Attorney General-but not the Commission-could file suit
in federal district court.141 The Commission was given, in addition,
power to investigate, to require reporting and record-keeping, and
to adopt procedural rules. 142 It was not given substantive rulemaking power.143
In the face of these restrictions of its formal powers, the EEOC
adopted other approaches that would enable it to be influential in
dealing with discriminatory conduct. Two such techniques were
approved by the Supreme Court in Griggs: the elevation of a finding
of reasonable cause into a decision with some value as precedent144
and the issuance of interpretative guidelines indicating the application of title VII to general classes of situations.145 As noted
above, the power to issue such guidelines does not flow from any
clear congressional grant of authority. 146 Yet, as Professor Davis
points out, such a power is an attribute of any administrative agency
140. See H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1963).
141. Civil rughts Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 706-07, 78 Stat. 259, as
amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4-5, 86
Stat. 104.
142. Civil rughts Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 709-10, 713(a) 78 Stat.
262, as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§§ 6-7, 86 Stat. 107.
143. Section 7I3(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970), gives the EEOC only
procedural rule-making power. The word "procedural" was inserted into the section
granting rule-making authority on the motion of Representative Cellar, generally a
civil rights supporter. His amendment was adopted with little discussion and was eventually enacted. lI0 CONG. R.Ec. 2575 (1964), in LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 91, at
3329. Section 713(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970), which protects individual
respondents who act in accordance with advisory opinions given by the Commission,
certainly cannot be considered a grant of general rule-making authority. Thus the legislative history of title VII seems to indicate clearly that Congress did not intend to grant
the EEOC substantive rule-making power.
144. See 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
145. 401 U.S. at 433-34.
146. See note 143 supra. But cf. ruiey v. Bendix Corp., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 951
(5th Cir. July 14, 1972), in which the court referred to section 7I3(a) as authority for the
issuance of the guidelines on religious discrimination. The case, however, appears to
have turned on the congressional validation of the EEOC's interpretation in the 1972
amendments to title VII, which added section 70I(j) defining religious discrimination.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103.
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that interprets and applies a statute.147 The power to interpret and
apply the statute carries with it the power to announce in advance
how the agency intends to perform these tasks. Thus, the Commission drew its authority to issue guidelines from its function of
interpreting title VII. But whence came this function?
Under the statute, the Commission is first to investigate a charge
that title VII has been violated, and then to determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true. This
process requires that the Commission interpret title VII, in a preliminary manner, in light of the facts gathered during its investigation.148 The authority to issue guidelines ultimately rests on the
EEOC's power to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe
title VII has been violated. Except for the reasonable-cause provision,
it is difficult to find justification in the statute for the guidelines.
Perhaps the "technical assistance"149 or "technical studies"150 subsections could provide such a basis. However, the testing guidelines
mentioned in Griggs involved a direct form of statutory interpretation. The Court's conclusion that the guidelines must be
followed by the federal district courts endowed them with qualities
of law that are not the result of the usual technical studies.
The history of the finding-of-reasonable-cause requirements in
fair-employment,practice legislation is interesting. Most of the state
statutes existing prior to title VII required a finding of reasonable
or probable cause before conciliation efforts could be undertaken.151
But these provisions were usually ignored. Conciliation efforts were
commenced without adequate investigation or without a judgment
by an enforcing agency that any "wrong" need be corrected.lli2 This
technique contributed to weak conciliation settlements. Moreover,
when the probable-cause provisions were followed by the state
agencies, the finding simply consisted of one-line statements such as
147. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY Jusnc:E: A PRELIMlNARY INQUIRY (1969).
148. Under the intense pressures caused by a backlog of work, the Commission has
departed from the statutory procedure in 1970 in quest of "predecision settlements."
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1901.19(a)-(c) (1972). There is no evidence that this new procedure has
added any efficiency, dispatch, or justice to the work of the Commission.
149. The Commission has power "to furnish to persons subject to [title VII] such
technical assistance as they may request to further their compliance with [title VII] or
an order issued thereunder." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1970).
150. The Commission has power "to make such technical studies as are appropriate
to effectuate the purposes and policies of [title VII] and to make the results of such
studies available to the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1970),
151. See, e.g., CAL. l.ABoR CODE § 1421 (1971); N.Y. ExEc. L\.w § 297 (1972).
152. See Blumrosen, supra note 38, at 223-24,
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"the Commission finds probable cause to believe the statute has been
violated."
The state agencies did not consider the reasonable-cause finding
as a formal document interpreting the statute in light of the known
facts. This approach was developed by the EEOC and has proved to
be a genuine innovation.153 It has spawned hundreds of published
decisions and a matrix of law that never existed before the Commission was established. It also provides the logical foundation for
the issuance of interpretative guidelines.
However, the question of the weight to be accorded the EEOC
guidelines is another matter. Since the authority to issue guidelines
is based on the authority to interpret title VII, these guidelines are
a fortiori "interpretative" rules within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.154 As a consequence, no hearing or public
participation in the guideline-making process is required.155 Therefore, in preparation for the testing guidelines, the EEOC Office of
Research called together a group of testing experts, to whom Ken
Holbert and I explained the nature of the problem of discrimination
with which we were confronted, and asked them to prepare a statement. That statement was later reviewed by the General Counsel and
his staff, and by the Commissioners before issuance.
The utility of guidelines and bulletins is obvious. Labor relations
of large corporations are conducted on a sophisticated basis; labor
relations experts, lawyers, personnel officials, union officers, and the
like constantly keep up to date on developments in the law and
regulations affecting their operation. They read the volumes of
loose-leaf material that are issued by regulatory agencies and serve
as part of the "law transmission system," which carries into effect
the interpretation of statutes and regulations in thousands of industrial-relations situations. Without the benefit of this system, the
decision makers in Washington would never be heard or heeded in
the plants throughout the country. 156
The industrial-relations community-labor and managementis accustomed to receiving guidance and information in the form
of agency decisions, interpretations, and bulletins. The EEOC at153. See A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 19-20, 44-46.
154. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
155. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1970).
156. For a discussion of the types of problems encountered by the law transmission
system when implementing administrative interpretations and guidelines, see Cramton,
Causes and Cures of Administrative Delay, 58 A.B.A. J. 937 (1972).
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tached itself to this tradition by publishing "sanitized versions"157
of the reasonable-cause findings, and by publishing guidelines on
employment testing and other subjects.158 These guidelines and interpretations enable intelligent responses by the industrial-relations
community. The response may demonstrate agreement within the
industrial-relations comm.unity with respect to the EEOC's interpretation and encourage a change of policy as dictated by the guide~
lines, or, at the other extreme, guidelines may lead to litigation
against the EEOC's decision as in the airlines159 and the newspaper160
cases.
The original testing guidelines consisted of one paragraph of
legal interpretation (that is the paragraph involved in Griggs), while
the remainder contained background statements concerning good
personnel-testing procedures. In passing on the validity of the Commission's interpretation, the Supreme Court stated in Griggs:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h)
to permit only the use of job-related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great
deference. . .. Since the Act and its legislative history support the
Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress. ...
. . . From the sum of the legislative history relevant in this case,
the conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's construction of§ 703(h)
to require that employment tests be job related comports with congressional intent.161

The importance of the distinction between those guidelines that
should be given "great weight" and those that "express the will of
Congress" presumably will not be lost in the federal district courts.
The binding effect given the guidelines is one additional indicator
of the importance the Court has attached to the policy of eliminating
discrimination.
The process used by the Supreme Court in determining the
validity of EEOC guidelines involves a search through the legislative
history for a clear demonstration that the EEOC interpretation was
157. This means giving descriptions of the facts without giving the names of the
parties or revealing what was said or done during conciliation attempts, in conformity
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
158. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.31 (sex), 1605.1 (religion), 1606.1 (national origin), 1607.1-.14
(employee selection procedures) (1972).
159. Air Transp. Assn. of America v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967).
160. American Newspapers Publishers Assn. v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C.
1968).
161. 401 U.S. at 433-34, 436 (emphasis added).
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not intended. If the matter is ambiguous or if the legislative history
supports the interpretation of the EEOC, the Griggs analysis requires
that the district courts follow the guidelines. This confers great
responsibility on the EEOC, a responsibility fully commensurate
with the policy of providing equal opportunity and the desirability
that the industrial-relations community be given specific guidance.
In light of the shifting meaning of discrimination and the
evolving conceptions of equal opportunity, there will be few matters
on which the congressional intent will be found to be clearly
contrary to a Commission guideline. The congressional discussion
never reached the level of detail that is involved in the application
of title VII to particular cases. The legal concept of discrimination,
which is itself a fundamental notion underlying all of the detailed
matters of interpretation, was not seriously addressed by the
Congress. It is a jurisprudential conception, derived from the law
of tort, and far more suitable for exposition through judicial
decision than for careful examination in the political forum.
Congressmen can react to social needs. Their administrative
staffs and interest groups can prepare studies, data, and arguments.
The Justice Department lawyers can prepare scholarly memoranda
for use in the heat of the political debate, and legal and other
academicians can review these proposals and recommend changes.
Out of these ingredients the legislative product emerges. But the
legislation itself is far from the last word. The application of the
legislation to specific situations remains. The administrative and
judicial processes work between the cup of legislation and the lip
of life. The jurisprudential conceptions applied at this point determine the operative effect of the statute.
Two examples pointing in opposite directions will suffice.
Judicial hostility to the workman's compensation acts is the classic
illustration of how reluctance by judges-in this case reluctance to
surrender their control over the course of personal-injury litigation
in employment--can neutralize legislative intent.162 On the other
hand, one need only examine the Supreme Court's sympathetic
support of the comparative-negligence principle in the Federal Employers' Liability Act163 cases to find an example at the other extreme.
In these cases, the network of negligence doctrines has been cast
aside in furtherance of the congressional policy.164
162. See, e.g., Jacquemin v. Turner 8: Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 103 A. ll5
(1918); Leckie v. H.P. Foote Lumber Co., 40 S.2d 249 (La. App. 1948).
163. 45 u.s.c. §§ 51-60 (1970).
164. See, e.g., Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., .354 U.S. 901 (1957); Rogers v. Mis•
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It is now indisputable that the intention of the federal courts is
to afford maximum minority employment opportunity under title
VII. Minority employment programs under executive orders have
been given judicial support and sanction,165 and the courts have
made clear that, if necessary, constitutional principles will be
brought into play to accomplish this goal.166 Nevertheless, the hope
remains in the judiciary that the administrative agencies will be
able to do the job.167 To this end, the courts are arming the "poor
enfeebled thing" with the necessary doctrinal tools and are encouraging private litigants to act as "private attorney generals"
by liberally granting attorney's fees to the prevailing party.168 In
short, the federal courts are taking the view that the national crisis
that gave rise to title VII still exists and that the application of the
statute may determine the outcome of that crisis.169
VIII. THE LIMITS OF GRIGGS
We can expect criticisms of Griggs on a variety of grounds. Those
who have developed "theories of fair employment practice laws"
may maintain that the decision does violence to their conceptions
of the function and purpose of fair-employment laws. For example,
Professor Fiss of the University of Chicago has stated,
The employer's interest in wealth maximization and the rigors of
the market place are generally acknowledged in fair employment
laws. A fair employment law is a limited corrective strategy and the
societal interest in efficiency is a major limitation.110
Similarly, the anonymous but influential Harvard Law Review has
said, "Congress in Title VII attempted to aid minority employment
within the constraints of color blindness and non-interference with
employer decisions that are based on legitimate business considerations."171
souri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54
(1943).
165. Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1971). Cf. Porcelli v. Titus,
431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
166. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
167. Hadnott v. Laird, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 375 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 29, 1972).
168. See note 60 supra.
169. Compare Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting):
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage,
and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and the
general propositions of law which nobody disputes, Propositions as to public policy
rarely are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of
unanimous proof.
'
. 170. A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 235, 303 (1971).
171. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights .ti.ct of 1964, 84 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1109, 1166 (1971).
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Both of these formulations are contradicted by the analysis in
Griggs. Insofar as the language of the statute and its history are
concerned, the Griggs decision seems correct.172 Neither wealth maximization, management prerogative, nor color blindness were dominant themes in the congressional decision. 173
There is another difficulty with what may be called the "FissHarvard" analyses. They assume that legal rules should describe
directly and in detail the result that the law seeks to achieve. This
is too simple a notion. Legal rules are filtered through the law transmission system.174 Thousands of men and women must respond to
these rules in the exercise of their discretion as lawyers, writers,
academics, personnel administrators, management officials, civil
rights advocates, union officials, and the like. They must internalize
and accept certain propositions from the perspective of their own
particular roles within their own structures. It is literally impossible
to write a single statement or a single opinion that will be tailored
to the situations of all who have contributed to the operation of
systems that have restricted minority employment opportunities.
To maintain maximum pressure on this network of discriminatory
attitudes, actions, and concepts, the law of employment discrimination speaks in broad, principled terms and forces the responses
into narrow channels of justification. This maximizes the likelihood that the law will indeed affect the course of conduct concerning
minorities.
To meet a massive problem, a massive dose of law is required.
Liberal judicial construction and a maximum enforcement effort
are also essential. We can count on the conservative forces-political,
172. For an example of how the legislative history will seem at odds with the Griggs
decision in the absence of the concept of discrimination adopted by the Supreme Court,
see Wilson, supra note 86, at 852-58.
173. The subordination of managerial prerogative with respect to racial discrimination was precisely what Congress did have in mind. See text accompanying notes 90-96
supra. The Harvard Development, supra note 171, is especially unresponsive to the
basic congressional judgment that racial discrimination was to be dealt with without
any bona fide occupational qualification privilege, while that privilege was available to
the other grounds of discrimination. The part of the Development dealing with racial
discrimination is based on the principle of balancing minority interests within the
constraints of color blindness and noninterference with employer decisions. But
in its discussion of the bona fide occupational qualifications with regard to sex,
the Development concludes, "The statute offers no exception based on cost ••• to be
borne by employers ordered to cease sex discriminations." Id. at 1180. Without disagree•
ing with its conclusion considering the scope of the bona fide occupational qualification,
the Development seems prepared to go further in protecting management interests in
connection with race discrimination than in connection with sex discrimination. This
judgment was squarely rejected in the congressional debates over section 703(e).
174. A formal discussion of this system can be found in Laswell, Toward Continuing
Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society, in THE I.Aw SCHOOL OF TOMORROW 87 (D.
Haber &: J. Cohen ed. 1968). For suggestions as to its application in this field, see
A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 20-23, 155, 213-17.
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economic, legal, and social-to protect their vital interests and thus
to modify the effect of our legal formulation in the specific life
situations. A broad statement of law is necessary to begin to achieve
meaningful results.
Obviously, there are risks in this approach. The message of the
Court might be taken too literally. There are two responses to this
fear. First, the appellate courts will correct overreaction. Yet, even
if overreaction is an actual risk, we must ask who should bear the
consequences of a court's misperception of its role-the class of
minorities who have been the victims of discrimination, or the class
of respondents who have created and administered the discriminatory pattern? This inquiry takes us back to the fundamental policy
judgment concerning the sweep that the Court should be prepared
to give to the statute. If this sweep be broad, one of the risks that
may be appropriately placed on the defendants is that involving a
mistaken application of the statute. This limited risk can, however,
be cured through the appellate stages of litigation. To help minorities clear out the morass of discriminatory patterns present in this
nation's economy, Congress appropriately placed the burden of such
litigation on the respondent class. This Article has been concerned
with the positive scope of the Griggs principle because the outer
reaches of Griggs will determine the ex.tent to which the law will
cope with inequality in employment opportunities. Yet, it is also
necessary to consider the other side of the coin, the question of
Griggs' limits. If discrimination is defined by the presence of "builtin headwinds" against minority grQups, then the absence of this
adverse effect on minorities would force plaintiffs back to the evilmotive and equal-treatment tests of discrimination.
The existence of adverse effect is a question of judgment. There
is no mechanical talisman to identify it. Adverse effect exists in many
areas at this time because of historical patterns of restrictions upon
minority group members and women. In coping with the present,
extreme situations, civil rights advocates and some governmental
agencies have begun to use "goals, targets, and timetables" to increase
minority and female employment opportunities. The "Philadelphia
Plan" of the Labor Department, which was created to deal with construction industry discrimination, takes this approach (subject to a
"good faith" defense) and has been upheld by the Third Circuit.176
The application of numerical proportions to recruiting for apprenticeship programs has also been upheld under title VII.176
175. Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
176. United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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In these circumstances, advocates for a rapid increase in minority
or female participation in the labor force argue for proportional
representation based on population figures, or for parity in employment opportunities. Racial minorities in central cities argue for a
formula based on the central city, rather than the county or region,
while advocates for women's rights uniformly rest their equal-opportunity demands on population proportions. The risk in accepting
these arguments is obvious. Once a statistical analysis becomes
popular, there may be a tendency for various groups to claim "their
share" of employment opportunities, for advocates to seize upon
proportional representation, and for administrators to think of
proportions as ends rather than means.
But such risks do not justify avoidance of the venture, for the
human needs are too great. The underlying concern of those who
worry about quotas and individual rights should be answered not in
a refusal to reform the inequalities in our society, but in a judgment
that the reform must succeed so that the interest in flexibility can be
reasserted.
The proportional-employment argument must be understood in
the context of the near-total exclusion of minority groups and women
from many sectors of the labor market. Where an employer or other
institution has virtually no female employees in other than minor
clerical positions, the argument that fifty per cent of the managers
should be females need not be understood as an argument in favor
of a world in which women hold fifty per cent of all jobs. Similarly,
where a construction union has substantially an all-white membership working in a city with sixty per cent black citizens, the argument
for population parity among journeymen electricians must be construed as an argument for a rapid increase in the number of minority
electricians. Viewed in these terms, the numerical standards proposed
in various plans and programs are not an end in themselves, but
rather a means of eliminating the adverse effect of historical discrimination patterns as rapidly as possible. So used, numerical
standards are essential as a remedial tool to eliminate patterns of
discrimination. Our history demonstrates that milder medicine will
not cure the disease, but that numerical standards will work. Less
specific standards are brushed aside in the interests of continuity of
institutional activity.
Numerical standards are attended to in our society and are capable of enforcement within institutions, and by government upon
404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.) cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969).
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institutions. Furthermore, concentration on numerical standards as
a remedy for discrimination permits the flexibility essential for our
institutions to continue.
The use of numerical standards will allow us to overcome one
inevitable dilemma posed by those who wish to reform industrialrelations systems. That is to say, if the remedy consists of using objective standards for qualification of employees, then because of the
history of discrimination in other areas of society, many minority
persons will be excluded from employment opportunities. The issue
then becomes the relevance of these standards, and that calls into play
the highly technical issue of validation. Thus, title VII may become
a full-employment act for industrial psychologists. Furthermore,
many judgments with respect to personnel actions are "net judgments" not fully capable of quantification in all of their dimensions;
the subjective aspects of hiring often cannot be quantified. Thus, a
rule requiring that judgments be made on objective criterion requires the respondent, ultimately, to "lie up to the headnote." This
approach creates a multitude of factual disputes; so we have also in
title VII a full-employment act for lawyers.
On the other hand, subjective judgments provide, in fact, a fertile atmosphere for producing attitudes, policies, prejudices, and
stereotypes, and consequently they may tend to restrict employment
opportunities of minorities and women. Where discrimination exists
the use of these subjective judgments should not be allowed, and, as
Jacksonville Terminal and Green v. McDonnell Douglas illustrate,
the courts are carefully cutting back on their use.
The dilemma, therefore, is that objective standards may exclude
minorities, while subjective standards may permit discrimination
against them. One way to resolve this dilemma is to measure employment practices against the basic principle of Griggs: If the adverse effect on minorities continues, then discrimination will be
deemed to still exist; when the adverse effect is no longer identifiable,
discrimination a la Griggs is at an end. While the adverse effect is
being eliminated, a primary consideration is whether, on the basis
of a flexible formula that will allow some deviation from the norm,
any particular remedial proposal adequately contributes to an acceptable increase in the number of minorities or females hired.
Thus, during the period of adverse effect, all criteria, objective and
subjective, are suspect if they do not contribute to the expeditious
elimination of the adverse effect.
Once the adverse effect has been dissipated, remedial programs
may be modified; but they should retain provisions to assure that
the adverse effect does not reassert itself once the hand of govern-
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ment is withdrawn.177 Thus, remedial programs should encourage
the industrial-relations system to operate fairly on its own terms and
within its own parameters. For example, an employer with an allwhite plant who recruits by word-of-mouth referral discriminates
because minorities do not have notice and opportunity to apply for
employment. The remedy to such a problem should include affirmative recruitment efforts that would lead to rapid increase in minority
employment. Once this has been ·achieved, the same word-of-mouth
referral system will operate among minority employees and their
friends and associates. The employer will then have a stream of
minority applicants. If the hiring practices have been otherwise corrected so that they do not exclude minorities at another point in
the procedure, the employment pattern for this employer thereafter
should continue to include substantial numbers of minorities.
Another example might be taken from Rowe v. General Motors,
the case in which the defendant's supervisors were predominantly
white males. Since the first-level supervisor is influential in deciding
who should be hired, promoted, and made supervisor, the tendency
to perpetuate the existing pattern is strong. But once a remedy has
been applied so that a substantial number of minority persons or
women have become supervisors, they will seek to maintain and promote some of their own into positions of influence and ultimately
into positions similar to theirs. The same phenomena that discriminate when the system was controlled by white males will provide
an integrative effect, once minorities and women have occupied some
of the supervisory positions. At that point, governmental programs
should become far less important.
The phrase used by Chief Justice Burger-"built-in headwinds"
--captured the sense of futility and frustration that has confronted
minorities in their quest for equality. Griggs measured that frustration by gross statistics. The high school diploma test screened out
three times as many blacks as whites; the Wonderlic test screened
out nine times as many blacks.178 The Court's prohibition of these
requirements will serve to alleviate the impact of discrimination on
minorities. But when does the sense of injustice fade? When does the
adverse effect dissipate? At what point does discrimination end, or,
more precisely, at what point along a continuum is it appropriate to
reduce restraints on the employer's practices?
A reduction in legal pressure may be appropriate long before the
law gives up jurisdiction. The adverse effect will dissipate before
177. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970);
Davis v. Washington, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1132 (D.D.C. July 31, 1972).
178. 401 U.S. at 4!0 n.6.
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minority groups and women achieve a mathematical proportion of
the labor force. Griggs does not demand that the work force of each
large employer should be a microcosm of the total population or
labor force. Griggs only requires that the structures responsible for
restricting minority opportunity be destroyed. The accomplishment
of this objective must be measured by increases in minority or female participation. Therefore, numerical standards are an appropriate tool. But carried to a pseudological conclusion, such standards
would structure opportunities on society along lines of race, national
origin, and sex. The individualist strain in our traditions stands
against that proposition. The moral strength behind the broad definition of discrimination also cuts against a mathematical allocation
of job opportunities by group characteristic. Thus, the use of this
third concept of discrimination should be decreased, and the range
of employer discretion increased, as the crude consequences of minority subordination are eliminated. We will revert back toward evilmotive and equal-treatment concepts of discrimination when the
social system operates in a fairer way.
When the adverse effect dissipates is a question of judgment for
courts and administrators. As with any such question, there is risk
of error. The Fifth Circuit in Whitfield committed such an error
when it said "angels could do no more" than to establish a "fresh
start" for the future, even though this approach would leave blacks
behind whites.179 It corrected this error in a stream of cases in the
late 1960's and in effect overruled Whitfield in 1970.180
There is-and can be-no guarantee that the courts and the administrators will wisely decide whether the adverse effect has been
dissipated. The pressure of cases will make them dependent on rules
of thumb based on statistics, which may, over time, be incorporated
into the law. But we have far to go before this stage is reached.181
The economic condition of minorities and the continuing lack of
employment opportunities suggest that much must be done-and
quickly-before serious disagreements over the need to continue
such strong remedies will arise. To achieve the prompt reform ·without creating a rigid system for allocating job opportunities requires
179. 263 F.2d at 551.
180. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
181. My own preference is to use relative unemployment figures to measure minority
progress. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 1, at 23-27. Earnings among comparable majority
and minority groups are also relevant. Id. Most of these indicators are complied
regularly by the federal government. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States, 1969, BLS
Rep. No. 375, at 13-46 (1970).
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that our administrators and courts be courageous and wise along
both dimensions.
IX.

EPILOGUE-ONE CONSEQUENCE OF A DECISION

By 1971, my life had substantially changed from the days when
we sought the issuance of the guidelines. Instead of commuting between Washington and the Deep South, I was commuting between
New York and Paris. After one recent trip, I found myself riding
to Newark with the industrial-relations director of a large national
company. We identified our common professional interests, and he
told me how his company and the union with which it bargains had
negotiated away certain education and testing requirements for
entry into training and apprenticeship programs. Since then, he said,
some 150 employees, two thirds of them black, had left the ranks of
the unskilled labor force of the company and entered into skilled
trades training or apprenticeship programs. Copies of the collective
bargaining agreement, both before and after the changes, are included as Appendix C, as a tribute to the influence of title VII and
the Commission guidelines, which were upheld in the Griggs decision.
X.

IN THE BEGINNING--AN EXPLANATION

The concept of rights of strangers is of ancient lineage, reaching
back to Exodus and Leviticus:
The stranger that sojourneth with you shall be unto you as the homeborn among you, and thou shall love him as thyself; for ye were
strangers in the land of Egypt ....
. . . Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger as
the homeborn ....182

Griggs dealt with such rights in an extraordinary setting, as District Judge Gordon noted. He began his opinion as follows:
Duke Power Company, the defendant in this action, is a corporation engaged in the generation, transmission, and distribution of
electric power .... The thirteen named plaintiffs are all Negroes
and contend that the defendant has engaged in employment practices prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . . . at
its Dan River Station located in Draper, North Carolina (recently
consolidated with the towns of Leaksville and Spray and named
Eden) •••.1sa
182. Leviticus 19:34, 24:22.
183. 292 F. Supp. at 244 (emphasis added).
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APPENDIX A
Commission decision applying testing guidelines of August 24,
1966, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GumE 1 17,304.53 (EEOC Dec. 2, 1966),
cited in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971):
On August 24, 1966, the Commission adopted Guidelines on
Employment Testing Procedures (1[ 16,904). In light of the Guidelines, the Commission concludes that reasonable cause exists to believe that Respondent's testing procedures are in violation of Title
VII of the Act.
The following facts are undisputed. Respondent employs approximately 2,465 persons in its Mill and Converter Plants . . . . While
Negroes constitute approximately 40% of [the local] population, they
constitute 6% of Respondent's work force. Commencing in 1958
Respondent has administered various tests to applicants for employment. From the beginning of 1957 through April 1964 Respondent
hired 386 whites and 12 Negroes; of the Converter plant employees
hired since then, between April 1964 and November 1965, 75 are
white and 4 are Negro.
Most of the jobs at Respondent's plant are in lines of progression, which means that an employee moves up from a lower paying
job on the bottom to a higher paying job on the top in accordance
with seniority, if able to perform the work. Most of the remaining
jobs, which involve less skilled and more menial work, are lower
paying "dead end" jobs with no prospect of advancement. Of the
white employees in the Converter operation, 797 (82%) are in line
of progression jobs while 177 (18%) are in dead end jobs. Of the
Negro employees in the Converter operation, 8 (8%) are in line of
progression jobs while 89 (92%) are in dead end jobs. In 1964 Respondent commenced administering tests to employees desiring to
move from dead end jobs to line of progression to another. Employees who were in line of progression jobs were not required to
take the tests to keep their jobs or to be promoted within lines of
progression. Since 1964, 94 white employees and 17 Negro employees
have taken the transfer tests. Of these, 58 whites (58%) and one
Negro (6%) passed. The one Negro who passed was outbid for the
job he was seeking by a higher seniority white.
It is significant that until 1963, shortly before the transfer tests
were instituted, Respondent maintained segregated jobs and lines of
progression, so that Negroes were categorically excluded on the
basis of their race from the more skilled and better paying jobs which
were reserved for "whites only." While the bars are no longer expressly in terms of race, it is plain that Respondent's testing procedures have had the effect of continuing the restriction on the entrance of Negro employees into "white" line of progression jobs.
We stated in our Guidelines: "If the facts indicate that an employer has discriminated in the past on the basis of race . . • the
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use of tests in such circumstances will be scrutinized carefully by the
Commission." Accordingly, where, as here, the employer has a history of excluding Negroes from employment opportunities it is incumbent upon the employer to show affirmatively that the tests themselves and the method of their application are non-discriminatory
within the meaning of Title VII.
Title VII permits employers to use ability tests which are "professionally developed" and which are not "designed, intended, or used"
to discriminate. As we have stated in our Guidelines, to be considered as "professionally developed," not only must the tests in question be devised by a person or firm in the business or profession of
developing employment tests, but in addition, the tests must be
developed and applied in accordance with the accepted standards of
the testing profession. Relevant here are the requirements that the
tests used be structured in terms of the skills required on the specific
jobs and that the tests be validated for those specific jobs. In other
words, before basing personnel actions on test results, it must have
been determined that those who pass the tests have a greater chance
for success on the particular jobs in question than those who fail.
Moreover, where the work force, or potential work force, is multiracial, the tests should be validated accordingly.
In the instant case, all prospective Converter Plant employees are
required to pass the Otis Employment Test IA or IB. Applicants
for jobs "requiring mechanical ability" are also required to pass the
Bennett test of Mechanical Comprehension Form AA and PTI Numerical Test A or B. For transfer, employees are required to pass or
have passed one or more of the above tests plus the Wonderlic Personnel Tests Form A. The Otis and Wonderlic tests measure "general intelligence," with particular loading on verbal facility; the
PTI test measures skill in arithmetic; the Bennett test measures
knowledge of physical principles. There is nothing in the voluminous
materials submitted by Respondent to indicate that the traits measured by these tests are traits which are necessary for the successful
performance of the specific jobs available at Respondent's plant. Nor
does it appear that any of the tests have been validated properly in
terms of the specific jobs available at Respondent's plant, or in terms
of the racial composition of Respondent's work force. In the absence
of evidence that the tests are properly validated, Respondent has no
rational basis for believing that employees and applicants who pass
the tests will make more successful employees than those who fail;
conversely, Respondent has no rational basis for believing that employees and applicants who fail the tests would not make successful
employees. Respondent's testing procedures, therefore, are not "professionally developed." Accordingly, since Respondent's testing procedures serve to perpetuate the same pattern of racial discrimination
which Respondent maintained overtly for many years before it began
testing, we conclude that there is reasonable cause to believe that
Respondent, thereby, has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.

110

Michigan Law Review
APPENDIX B

Extract from the Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-9 (footnotes omitted), Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971):
Moreover, in considering the deference to be accorded the Guidelines, it should be recognized that the EEOC has consciously sought
to construe Title VII "as broadly as possible in order to maximize the
effect of the statute on employment discrimination without going
back to Congress for more substantive legislation." In doing so, the
Commission, "depart[ed] ... from previous notions of what discrimination is" and, in taking "its interpretation of Title VII a step
further than other agencies have taken their statute," disregarded
"intent ... as crucial to the finding of an unlawful employment practice." In the process of this "creative interpretation" of the law,
the legislative history of the Act was regarded only an outer limit,
not a guide, apparently based on the premise that the courts "were
available to prevent serious error" and might sustain the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII, "partly out of deference to the administrators."

APPENDIX C
Extracts from an agreement between a large manufacturing company and a major industrial union relating to qualifications for participation in apprenticeship programs. The provisions of the 19711974 agreement represent a collectively bargained response to the
Commission guidelines on testing, 'which were upheld in Griggs.
1968-1971 AGREEMENT

1971-1974 AGREEMENT

Applicants for apprenticeship shall meet the following requirements:
1. Not less than eighteen nor more
1. Not less than eighteen nor more
than forty years of age. (No provithan thirty years of age. (Deals with
sion re citizenship.)
citizenship.)
2. An applicant who has not success2. High school graduate or equivalent.
fully completed a minimum of eight
(In exceptional cases, by mutual local
years of elementary education or
agreement between the parties, this
equivalent must demonstrate to the
qualification may be waived if the
joint plant training committee that
applicant has two or more years of
he has the potential to learn the
high school.)
particular apprenticeship job for
3. Satisfactorily pass the company's phywhich he has bid.
sical examination designed to estab3. Applicants shall be physically able
lish physical ability to work in the
to perform the work of the occutrade or craft, including 20/20 norpation and training program in•
mal or corrected vision and color
volved. In the determination of
determination test.
ability and physical fitness the com•
pany shall use such examinations and
evaluation procedures as are related
to the physical and training re•
quirements of the particular occu•
pation involved.

